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The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the role of
social norms and social networks on the organization of political
violence. Challenging traditional accounts of collective action, this
dissertation presents an alternative theoretical framework of recruitment
by organizations that aim to engage in political violence. The framework
hypothesizes that the use of social norms and social networks can
ix
help overcome the collective action problem for such organizations by
minimizing the need for selective incentive provision.
The theoretical framework is applied to two in-depth historical
case studies of the conflicts in Chechnya (1994–1996 and 1999–2009)
and Sierra Leone (1991–2002). Each case study is composed of two
analyses of the organization of political violence. In the case of Chechnya,
the organization of Chechen resistance in the First Russo-Chechen War
(1994–1996) and the organization of Chechen resistance in the Second
Russo-Chechen War (1999–2009) are treated as separate units of analysis.
In the case of Sierra Leone, the units of analysis are the Revolutionary
United Front that initiated the Sierra Leonean Civil War in 1991, and
the Civil Defense Forces that were organized in opposition to the
Revolutionary United Front in the mid-1990s.
The analysis of the results from the case studies supports the
hypotheses of the theoretical framework. Both case studies exhibit
significant within-case variation. In both cases, it is shown that use of
the norms and networks of the sociopolitical environment within which
the organizations of political violence operate has a favorable effect on
successful recruitment, and that non-use of these mechanisms has a
detrimental effect. In addition, the results have implications for current
theoretical debates in the literature on domestic conflict, as well as
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The central question that this dissertation intends to examine is how
organizations that aim to engage in organized violence as means to
some political end form and manage to attract initial recruitment. In
simple terms, how do such groups ever get off the ground? Past studies
of these phenomena have traditionally regarded such organizations as
monolithic groups with uniform preferences that effectively pursued
identical interests. For example, in his seminal account Ethnic Groups in
Conflict, Donald L. Horowitz approaches the subject from a perspective
that analyzes the phenomenon strictly at the group level. As a result, the
motivations, processes, outcomes, and even the prescriptions for effective
conflict management that the study provides are also at the group level
of analysis. Horowitz (1985, 28) states that “relations between ethnic
superiors and subordinates usually embody at least some elements of
social cohesion and shared expectations.” He concludes that this leads to
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adaptive behavior by the subordinate group to hierarchical requirements,
and “a substantial measure of predictability in relationships.” This type of
top-down formulation, which concentrates decision-making at the elite
level, essentially sidesteps the issue of recruitment, since all potential
participants are regarded as active in some general and unspecified sense.
All individuals who fall under the categorization of any particular conflict
could actively participate at any given point in time and there are no clear
criteria for differentiating between those who do participate and those
who do not.
1.1 Scope of the Study
This dissertation accomplishes three major tasks: it is literature-assessing,
it is theory-proposing, and it is theory-testing 1. It surveys and evaluates the
existing literature on intrastate conflict processes to illustrate the lacuna
that exists with respect to the study of recruitment processes. A major
motivation for this dissertation is that the literature has not provided
satisfactory answers to the questions that this dissertations addresses.
The dissertation presents a theoretical framework in order to
investigate the role of social norms and social networks on the
organization of political violence. The framework represents a challenge
to traditional accounts of collective action, where the prescribed solution
is the provision of selective incentives in order to overcome the free-rider
1The terminology is from Van Evera’s (1997, 89-95) discussion of dissertation types.
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problem of collective action. The framework hypothesizes that the use
of social norms and social networks can serve as a complementary
mechanism that minimizes the need for selective incentive provision.
In order to build the theoretical framework, I synthesize elements
from different bodies of literature that speak to the issue of political
violence. Elements from the literatures on social movements, networks,
and norms are integrated with concepts from the economic literature on
asymmetric information, in order to present the theoretical argument of
the framework. As a result, the dissertation advances a new understanding
of the recruitment processes of violent political organizations through
the formulation of a deductive argument and testable hypotheses derived
from that new theoretical framework.
The theoretical framework is applied to two in-depth historical
case studies of the conflicts in Chechnya (1994–1996 and 1999–2009)
and Sierra Leone (1991–2002). Each case study is composed of two
analyses of the organization of political violence. In the case of Chechnya,
the organization of Chechen resistance in the First Russo-Chechen War
(1994–1996) and the organization of Chechen resistance in the Second
Russo-Chechen War (1999–2009) are treated as separate units of analysis.
In the case of Sierra Leone, the units of analysis are the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) that initiated the Sierra Leonean Civil War in 1991,
and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) that were organized in opposition to
the Revolutionary United Front in the mid-1990s.
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1.2 Need for the study
The systematic study of conflict has mostly focused on war at
the international level between nation-states. One of the defining
characteristics of statehood is the monopolization over the legitimate
use of force within its prescribed territory, an attribute that Max Weber
famously characterized as the defining attribute of sovereignty. However,
in most forms of violent conflict, that aspect of sovereignty is precisely
what the actors who engage in such actions lack; in fact, in most of these
situations actors are fighting on the opposite side of those institutions that
enjoy the advantage of sovereignty.
Another way to state this fundamental difference between state
and non-state actors is that the former invariably hold the advantage
of maintaining professional standing armies while the latter do not.
A fundamental consequence of this distinction is that recruitment for
state and non-state actors are two markedly different processes. For
many states throughout history, recruitment was a non-issue since
military service was mandatory; in fact, that remains the case for
the majority of nation-states. On the other hand, the trend towards
the professionalization of military service has led to careerism, which
effectively transforms recruitment into self-selection. However, for
non-state actors the problem of how to attract membership remains.
Since the advent of professional armed forces, recruitment tactics
by states have included a combination of methods that can be classified
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as coercion such as mandatory service, conscription/drafting of reserves
in times of increased demand, and incentive-based approaches mainly
in the form of career opportunities in the armed services, as well as
social and monetary benefits. Similarly, non-state actors that aim to
recruit combatants must also do so by a combination of coercion and
provision of incentives (both pecuniary and otherwise). By contrast,
non-state actors lack both the institutionalization of a professional army
within the apparatus of the nation-state and the corresponding legitimacy.
At the same time though, it is also true that insurgents tend to follow
the organizational structure of a professional army and usually include
elements that have received specialized training either directly from a
professional army or a similarly organized insurgent group.
Another crucial difference - one that is obfuscated by the
transposition of the unitary actor assumption to non-state actors - is that
while a professional army essentially monopolizes the legitimate use of
force as an instrument that projects the power of a nation-state, non-state
actors generally do not. Therefore, when researchers discuss conflicts
between specific groups (ethnic or otherwise, but this practice is much
more pronounced in studies of ethnic wars), they typically assume a
monopolization of the use of force that may or may not exist. Moreover,
this assumption presupposes that to the extent that any sub-divisions
within the group exist, they all act in concert against a common enemy.
However, it may be the case that within-group competition is concurrent
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with between-group competition. For example, sub-groups may have a
long-term incentive to fight amongst themselves for the ability to set the
agenda for the entire group, even if that entails short-term losses for both
the sub-group and the group as a whole.
A common way to explain the conceptual puzzle of participation
in organized political violence is to characterize it as a collective action
problem where potential contributors have a personal incentive to
free-ride on the contributions of others. Jessica Stern (2003, 3) illustrates
the concept with the following example: “When Jewish extremists attempt
to lay a cornerstone for the Third Temple they hope to build, all
like-minded messianic Jews (and messianic Christians) benefit. Only the
participants pay: When they ascend the Temple Mount, they incur risks
to their person, their livelihood, freedom, and families. Given this, the
extremist should be asking himself: Why bother participating? Why not
let others do the work and take the risks?” It is hard to argue with such
eloquent logic; yet, as I explain later on, there are many related issues
that remain unexplained. If all Jews, both extremists and moderates
alike, recognize the logic (a debatable point in itself), then why does
anyone bear the risk? Or, if at some point no one was willing to do
so, who were those first risk-takers, how were they able to attract more
like-minded individuals to their cause, and why did they not fail at the
outset, presumably when at their most vulnerable? Most fundamentally,
is it the case that all forms of political violence can be explained by this
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theoretical device? In other words, is there no variation in the severity
of collective action problems that may arise in the attempts of non-state
actors to organize political violence?
Another conceptual problem that generally goes unnoticed in this
transposition of the logic of collective action to the organization of
political violence is that the nature of the collective benefit is never defined
in exact terms. Collective action theories were initially formulated to
highlight problems in the provision of public goods and to find solutions
to those problems. And, by and large, overcoming collective action
problems results in successful provision of those public goods, because
the inducement of contribution is a sufficient determinant of successful
provision. Yet consider the above example by Stern; what exactly is the
public good that is being provided? It is assumed to be a collective benefit
to Messianic Jews and Christians. But the outcome that would bring about
the collective benefit (in this case, the construction of a Third Temple
on Temple Mount) cannot possibly be the result of successful collective
action. Rather, it is the outcome of a conflict process that is not captured
by the dynamic presented in the example; surely the actions of Muslims
are likely to have something to do with such an outcome coming about.
That strategic aspect of conflict processes is completely ignored by this
formulation.
But if such a framework cannot provide an explanation for conflict
outcomes, then which aspect of conflict processes can it capture? The
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answer is that the collective benefit that ought to be studied is the
provision of violence. In other words, the crucial stage is the ability of
political organizations to reach the conditions sufficient for the provision
of violence. Thus, what is necessary is a framework that explains
recruitment for the provision of political violence.
The traditional response to such questions has been that collective
action problems are alleviated by the provision of personal selective
incentives to individual participants in addition to the collective incentive,
which by itself is insufficient to encourage participation. As I illustrate in
the theoretical analysis in the next chapter, there are theoretical problems
with this approach. The provision of any type of targeted selective
incentives at the nascent stage of organization logically presupposes the
existence of prior organizational capacity. In other words, if resources
are being distributed, then the mechanisms for their distribution and
the decision-making processes that resulted in them have already taken
place. This necessitates the existence of the very organization structure
whose formation we aim to explain. If this structure is assumed, then
the theoretical puzzle is transformed from group formation to recruitment
by an organization at its nascent stages. But such an organization can
be expected to be relatively vulnerable at this stage of its development.
For example, there could be other organizations competing for control of
the same resources and aiming to attract the same participation. Even in
the absence of such competition, a comparison can be made between the
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organization at its nascent and its ideal form in terms of size and resource
accumulation: in both cases, it could be reasonably assumed that the ideal
form would be larger and control more resources than the nascent form.
Therefore, this should be the stage where such organizations would want
to distribute as few resources as possible in order to facilitate recruitment.
The study of recruitment is a necessary component of
understanding the processes that shape the organization of political
violence, as well as its conduct. No matter what the preferences of
organizations that engage in political violence are, they need to achieve a
sufficient membership base that would give them the capacity to attempt
to reach their objectives. It is a necessary precondition for action and its
accomplishment cannot simply continue to be assumed, as it has been
by much of the literature. In the next section, I review the debates in the
current literature in order to illustrate that the question of recruitment is
not adequately addressed by the existing state of the art in the field.
Moreover, the study of recruitment has serious policy implications.
Understanding how organizations of political violence get to reach ‘critical
mass’ has serious implications for the possibility of external intervention
and mediation in conflicts as well as peacemaking/peacekeeping
attempts. The prospects for successful mediation are all the more
relevant in cases of potential genocide or general gross violations of
human rights during conflict. External actors can anticipate recruitment
by understanding and examining the social factors that facilitate
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recruitment. One of the criticisms leveled at approaches that tend to
group conflicts in dichotomous typologies - such as those discussed in
the next section - is that they provide simplistic policy recommendations
that may not necessarily work in every scenario2. Drawing attention to the
role that social components play in these processes can steer influence
in the other direction, where policymakers see the utility of taking the
sociopolitical context into account for each individual case, rather than
make wholesale policy recommendations.
1.3 Review of the literature
In this section, I present a survey of recent trends in the literature on
intrastate conflict. I give an overview of existing theoretical models that
deal with the same questions that I address, and highlight the gaps that
this dissertation fills in the existing literature. These models aim to explain
the incidence of domestic conflict and represent the state of the art in
this research area; yet they largely neglect to address the question of
recruitment. I also present a review of recent literature that departs from
macro-level conceptualizations of conflict processes and shifts attention
to micro-level interactions. It is in this new research area that I place this
dissertation.
2For example, see Berdal (2005) for a discussion of the effect that the ‘greed and
grievance’ debate had on United Nations’ missions in Africa.
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1.3.1 Recent debates in the literature on civil wars
1.3.1.1 Ethnic and non-ethnic wars
The study of conflict at the domestic level has traditionally been the
purview of the research area of comparative politics. Even then, the
scope of inquiry had been restricted to the study of civil war, with the two
major subdivisions of causation being ethnonationalist and ideological. In
recent years, a trend has developed of increasing convergence between the
study of conflict at the domestic and international level, with scholarship
from comparative politics and international relations3. The earliest
developments of this trend were guided by the transposition of key
concepts such as anarchy and the security dilemma from the international
to the domestic level.
The concepts of anarchy and the corresponding pursuit of power
are cornerstones of international relations’ theory. One can trace their
usage back to the Athenian proclamation during the Melian Dialogue
in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War that “while the strong
do what they can, the weak suffer what they must” (Stassler 1996, 352).
The same logic pervades Hobbes’ Leviathan and his conception of the
human condition in the state of nature as war of all against all. The
logic was appropriated by the theoretical school of classical realism in
international relations (Morgenthau 1948), which posited that the innate
human propensity to seek power is afforded free reign in the international
3For a survey of this development see Lake (2003).
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system due to anarchy. Subsequent offshoots of the classical realist
tradition, most notably defensive realism (Waltz 1959; 1979) reevaluated
the consequences of anarchy as a need for security in an environment
where the threat of violence against any state was constant. The associated
inference, known as the security dilemma, is that attempts by one state to
improve its own security makes all other states worse off leading to a spiral
of insecurity when they in turn attempt to improve their own security as
a result of the actions of the first (Jervis 1978). The logic was transposed
from the international level to the domestic level by Posen (1993), who
argued that the breakdown of state authority leads to a condition of
anarchy at the domestic level and a corresponding security dilemma
among ethnic groups. Fearon (1998) extended the logic by claiming that
this phenomenon should in turn lead to conflict among ethnic groups due
to a contractual inability to make credible commitments4.
The problem with the application of this logic to cases of civil
war is that it assumes that groups are unitary, well-defined, and
purposely single-minded. It assumes that the master cleavage of the
conflict adequately captures both the causes of the conflict as well
as the motivations of individuals at both the political and the private
4Interestingly, the origins of Fearon’s conceptual framework can be traced back to the
usage of the concepts of contractual incompleteness and unenforceability in the theory
of the firm. For example, see Hart (1995) for the original formulation and Bowles (2004)
for a reinterpretation. In recent years, the research area of contractual incompleteness
has become increasingly important in the field of economics, as well as political science.
Most recently, Lake (2009) has used the same theoretical foundations to explain the role
of hierarchy in political organization.
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level (Kalyvas 2008). However, there is nothing that necessitates the
involvement of a group in conflict as a monolith. The unitary actor
assumption is easier to justify in theories of international relations
where the unit of analysis has traditionally (and almost exclusively) been
the sovereign nation-state in the post-Westphalian international system.
However, this assumption is much more tenuous in the case of non-state
actors, especially in the area of combatant recruitment.
During the Cold War, the phenomenon of domestic conflict was
mainly characterized as a byproduct of superpower competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Correspondingly, the causes of
domestic conflict fell on either side of a dichotomy between ideologically
driven competition for the control of the state and ethnonationalist
tendencies in plural and/or post-colonial states. The end of the Cold
War brought about a remarkable, and rather unanticipated, increase
in the incidence of domestic conflict. Interstate conflict was largely
supplanted by conflict at the domestic level. Thus, the end of history
(Fukuyama 1992) and obsolescence of war (Mueller 1989) forecast by
many, as the defining ideological struggle of the century between
democracy and communism ended, did not materialize; rather, interstate
conflict was largely supplanted by conflict at the domestic level. The
main consequence of this shift in the nature of conflict has been the
disproportionate participation and targeting of civilians. Taking into
account differences in coding casualties of civil wars, such conflicts
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resulted in a total of 15-20 million deaths and approximately 67 million
displaced persons between 1945 and 1999. By comparison, interstate wars
resulted in 3.3 million deaths over the same time-period. In addition
to considerably more fatalities, civil wars have caused more internal
and external displacement of civilians, and disruption of economic and
sociocultural activities than interstate wars (Sambanis 2004).
Since the end of the Cold War, a large portion of the literature on
domestic conflict has focused on the causes and implications of ethnic
civil war. Lake and Rothchild (1996) applied the framework of the ethnic
security dilemma discussed above to the wave of ethnic conflict that came
about at the end of the Cold War. Yet while the general consensus at
the time was that the end of the Cold War contributed directly to the
sudden increase in ethnic conflict incidence, more recent accounts in
the literature present a different argument. Fearon and Laitin (2003)
argue that while the end of the Cold War fomented an environment that
facilitated these conflicts, it did not cause them. Rather, the current
prevalence of internal war is characterized as the result of a steady
accumulation of protracted conflicts.
Scholarship on the effect of ethnicity on conflict generally finds a
positive correlation. Sambanis (2001, 280) finds that “ethnic heterogeneity
is significantly and positively correlated with the onset of ethnic war.”5
Reynal-Querol (2002) finds that different components of ethnic identity
5It should be noted that this finding is antithetical to the literature on the economic
causes on civil war outlined further below.
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may have different effects on the likelihood of conflict; namely, she
finds that religion is a more significant social cleavage than language
in the development of civil war. The exact causal mechanisms in this
research area remain under-specified. For example, whereas Cederman
and Girardin (2007) find that ethnic minority dominance is a major risk
factor, Fearon, Kasara and Laitin (2007) find that the association is weak
and that the relationship is a partial correlation rather than a causal factor.
1.3.1.2 “New” and “old” wars
A branch in the literature that emerged in the post-Cold War era made a
sharp distinction at that momentous point in time. The main argument
was that from that point on wars would be distinctly different in nature
from past conflicts. The original statement of this thesis was made in
journalistic accounts that surveyed the landscape of war in the 1990s
and saw unprecedented phenomena in the conduct of political violence.
Michael Ignatieff (1993; 1997) saw nationalism as the definitive cause
of conflict in the new paradigm. Kaplan’s (1993; 1994) travels through
the Balkans and West Africa resulted in prognostications that so-called
“ethnic hatreds” - kept in check by the order imposed by the Cold War -
would come to the fore, and that an increasingly anarchic international
system would suffer the erosion of sovereignty over time amidst a host of
problems6.
6Kaplan is discussed further in the case study of Sierra Leone, since it represents one
of Kaplan’s examples for this emerging trend.
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In addition to that trend - which was very successful in affecting
popular conceptions of future at the time - there are scholarly accounts
of a similar vein. Holsti (1996), building on Van Creveld’s (1991) ideas on
the transformation of war, presents an image of war that borders on the
chaotic. Holsti claims that in new wars there are no strategies, no tactics,
and no military organization of which to speak. More significantly for
the author, there is no distinction between the state, the military, and the
population. The ultimate difference is that old wars had political goals:
either to protect an existing political community or to create a new one.
But “in these wars, ordinary cost-benefit analyses that underlie wars as a
“continuation of politics by other means” no longer apply” (Holsti 1996,
38)7.
Kaldor (1999) argues that new wars differ from earlier wars in
three fundamental ways: goals, methods, and financing. According to
Kaldor, new wars are fought over identities, whereas old wars were fought
over ideology. Whereas old wars were fought with conventional means,
strategies, and tactics in an attempt to control territory and state power,
new wars are fought as guerrilla insurgencies in an attempt to control
populations and resources. The final difference - one that highlights
the main theme of the book, which is that globalizing tendencies are
inextricably linked with the transformation of war - is the contrast in the
two types of war economies. The political economies of old wars were
7It is unclear if by this Holsti means that there are absolutely no political goals in new
wars.
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“centralized, totalizing, and autarchic” (Kaldor 1999, 9). The new war
economies are characterized either by external support through channels
such as diasporas or transnational networks, or self-financing that results
from exploitation of domestic resources.
Kalyvas (2001) derives three major dimensions of differentiation
between new and old civil wars from this literature. He distills the
literature to the following points: old wars were caused by grievances,
broadly supported by the population, and rebel behavior was generally
restrained in the use of violence; conversely, new wars are characterized
by insurgent behavior that is criminal, unpopular and wantonly violent.
Kalyvas finds that this dichotomization of civil war types is overstated, and
possibly the result of overlooking historical research on past conflicts. In
addition, he cautions against paying disproportionate attention to highly
visible events (such as atrocities that dominate media attention) that may
be potentially misleading by drawing attention from the broader patterns
of warfare and violence in a particular conflict.
1.3.1.3 ‘Greed and grievance’
Perhaps the most important development in the newly emergent literature
on civil wars has been the replacement of the ethnonationalist-ideological
dichotomy with that of ‘greed and grievance’ (Berdal and Malone 2000;
Collier and Hoeffler 2000). According to this new approach, new civil
wars arise from either political grievances - resembling in that sense
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more traditional accounts of rebellion such as Gurr (1970) - or narrowly
motivated greed, in cases where groups that engage in violence do so for
the purpose of resource extraction.
The most prominent scholarship in this research area has been
conducted by Collier and Hoeffler. Building on the foundations of earlier
economic theorists of rebellion such as Grossman (1990), they find that
natural resource endowments are positively correlated with the risk of civil
war, whereas ethno-linguistic fractionalization is negatively correlated
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Therefore, greed as the motivation for rebel
organizations to try to capture state power is more significant than
identity-based group grievance.
In later refinements of their model, Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
define grievance as high inequality, lack of political rights, and
ethnic/religious diversity. Moreover, they shift the conceptual focus away
from purely economic considerations by equating greed with political
opportunity for mobilization, which they refer to as “viability of rebellion”
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563). Correspondingly, their placement of
cases on the ‘greed-grievance’ scale effectively becomes one of political
motivation versus political opportunity. They conclude that opportunity
is more significant than motivation as a determinant of civil war onset.
An implicit assertion in this framework (one that justifies the
conceptual shift from greed to opportunity) is that greed is a constant
while opportunity is variable. In this respect, the authors are making
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assertions about human nature; namely, that greed is a characteristic
innate to sociopolitical organization and, by extension, to sociopolitical
competition over the allocation of limited resources. The theoretical
framework adopts the Hobbesian premise of the constancy of greed from
Hirshleifer’s postulation of the ‘Machiavellian Theorem’ which states that
“no-one will ever pass up an opportunity to gain a one-sided advantage by
exploiting another party” (Hirshleifer 2001, 10). Effectively, this statement
is logically equivalent to one that claims that human nature is inherently
profit-seeking, even if the use of force is necessary to attain that profit.
Similar to the Collier and Hoeffler model, Fearon and Laitin (2003)
find that greed is a better predictor of the onset of civil war than grievance,
and that greed is much better defined as political opportunity rather than
economic motivation. They define political opportunity as the existence
of conditions that favor insurgency, which involves specific technologies
of military conflict (small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare
from rural base areas) and the existence of a relatively weak state. These
factors are similar to the Collier Hoeffler model that identifies reliance on
primary commodity exports, an abundance of young males, and recent
periods of rapid economic decline as the primary attributes of political
opportunity.
Sambanis (2004, 260), in evaluating both the Collier and Hoeffler
and Fearon and Laitin models finds that they are both “often right
for the wrong reasons yet also wrong for the wrong reasons” by
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finding disagreement between the mechanisms underlying the processes
discussed in the statistical models and case studies of the two theoretical
frameworks. Despite this critique, Sambanis agrees that more research
should be conducted in this area by using the methodology employed
by the two models, which is a combination of statistical modeling and
in-depth case studies by area/country experts. Unlike both Collier and
Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin, Sambanis is not too quick to dismiss the
importance of ethnicity. In discussing the difficulty of defining ethnic war,
he asserts that ethnic mobilization is significant in itself even if it is not
a determinant of war onset per se. According to this logic, ethnicity can
serve to overcome collective action problems for the groups that are doing
the fighting.
In recent years, the conceptual distinction between greed and
grievance has come under fire. Mats Berdal (2005), one of the two
co-editors of the book (Berdal and Malone 2000) that popularized the
Collier and Hoeffler model, argues that the distinction is not as useful as
initially thought. New research shows that the case has been overstated
in relation to other political, cultural, and strategic factors (Ballentine
and Sherman 2003). The authors themselves have recently amended
their original framework in order to take into account valid criticisms
of the paradigm by shifting focus completely to the factors that shape
political opportunity (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2008). In this iteration
of the framework, they group ‘greed and grievance’ under the label
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of motivation, and find them both lacking in explanatory power in
comparison to feasibility.
However, the most significant drawback of the paradigm - at least
for the subject of this dissertation - is that it represents yet another
dichotomy that presents a static depiction of what are essentially complex,
dynamic, and strategic conflict processes. In fact, not only is the conflict
process dynamic, it may actually change the preferences and objectives
of participants as it develops (Kalyvas 2008). As a result, the process of
assigning a typology that describes the conflict at its outset, or ex post
facto labeling of a conflict without consideration of the strategic interplay
of actors that caused its trajectory, is very problematic.
1.3.1.4 Micro-level approaches8
The approaches presented above mostly focus their attention at the
macro-level of conflict causation. Another recent development, however,
has been the shift to micro-level mechanisms by shifting attention to the
motivations of individuals participating in organized political violence.
Gates (2002) uses principal-agent modelling analysis to examine
the organizational structure of rebel groups. He finds that geography,
ethnicity, and ideology are the three main determinants of military
success, defection deterrence, and recruitment strategy. The author’s
8The work of Jeremy Weinstein (2005;2007) independently, as well as with Macartan
Humphreys (2004; 2006; 2008) is relevant to this discussion. However, since it is of
direct significance to my theoretical framework and the case study of Sierra Leone, it is
presented in detail in the respective chapters.
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objective is to address the criticisms of the models presented above by
introducing a dynamic element to the modeling process. Gates’ model
is definitely a step in the right direction in the literature. It combines
micro-level and macro-level consideration and, as a result, provides
a much more comprehensive conceptualization of the processes that
shape recruitment in organizations of political violence. One drawback,
however, is that Gates “presume[s] that many collective action problems
associated with rebellion are overcome” (Gates 2002, 11). But, as the
theoretical framework that I present argues, the manner in which an
organization of political violence manages to overcome the collective
action problem has significant consequences on its ability to recruit both
at the initial stage, and throughout the duration of a conflict.
Kalyvas (2003) distances himself from the ‘greed and grievance’
dichotomy by focusing on the individual level even further. His main
argument is that political violence cannot be adequately understood
through the usage of monolithic conceptions of group identity that fail
to differentiate among the potentially divergent motivations of actors at
various levels. Instead, he proposes that we should focus our attention
at the interplay between political and private identities and actions. This
approach allows theorists to disaggregate the macro-level phenomenon
of civil war into its constituent parts, the many individual acts of violence
that provide coherence to the master cleavage of the conflict.
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Kalyvas also adapts the distinction between ‘greed and grievance’
to his own terms. He analyzes the philosophical foundations of the
two categories as derived, respectively, from Hobbes and Schmitt. In
his framework, the juxtaposition is not between economic vs. political
gain, or the pursuit of opportunistic profiteering vs. the expression of
collective grievance. Rather, it is one of anomy and anarchy brought about
by the breakdown of state authority vs. the very essence of groupness
that defines the master cleavage of wars. In other words, it is the
consideration and juxtaposition of private motivations and group loyalty.
Ultimately, he concludes, only through the consideration of both factors
can we understand the relationship between what motivates individuals
to act in a self-regarding manner and what motivates them to act in a
group-regarding manner, as well as the fact that the two types of behavior
are actually compatible.
Other accounts focus on specific phenomena during conflict - such
as the level of violence - that are not captured by the static dichotomies
of the models presented above. For example, Valentino, Huth and
Balch-Lindsay (2004) examine the incidence of mass killing, and find that
atrocities are often the result of calculated military strategy. They find
that, more often (and contrary to mass media portrayal of civil wars),
it is the government that resorts to mass killing rather the rebels, since
the relationship between guerrilla armies and the local population makes
them difficult to distinguish, and as a result more prone to be the victims.
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Kalyvas (2004) finds that indiscriminate violence (the element usually
termed “irrational” by more casual commentators of civil wars) is an
element of strategic utility when its cost is exceeded by the cost of selective
violence to the extent that it is unfeasible for organizations of political
violence.
This dissertation follows the philosophical principles of the works
described in this section. In order to further our understanding of conflict
processes at the domestic level, research in this area must necessarily
account for the dynamic and strategic aspects of interaction. A study
of recruitment is but one of the possible ways in which to contribute to
the literature. It is, however, a very important component that requires
immediate attention.
1.4 Methodology
This dissertation presents a theoretical framework of recruitment by
organizations of political violence. The framework is built through a
deductive process of analyzing the argument in the theory of collective
action (Olson 1965), identifying problems with that theory, and then
amending the theory in ways that address those problems.
The theoretical framework is then tested through two in-depth case
studies of conflicts. Neither case study was used at the theory building
stage; in fact, there were no theory-building case studies as the framework
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is constructed from first premises. Both case studies are based on review of
the secondary literature. The analysis of the two cases is not presented as
one cross-case comparative study, but as two within-case process tracing
studies of the organizations that were active in each case. Therefore, while
the case studies follow the convention within the literature of ‘countries
as case studies’, that is not the unit of analysis. Instead, the unit of
analysis is the organization of political violence. This allows the project
to take into consideration the macro-level (the conflict as a whole), the
meso-level (the primary unit of analysis) and the micro-level (individual
participants)9.
The cases were selected based on multiple criteria. Both cases
exhibit significant data richness. Since the case studies are based on
secondary literature, the cases need to have been studied sufficiently
and in ways that allow access to the voices of participants rather than
the interpretations of the authors alone10. In both cases, there is
considerable within-case variation on many different levels: there are
multiple organizations, evolving criteria of membership and recruitment,
and shifting patterns of operation and objectives. This allows the
characterization of the cases to move beyond static typologies that
focus on single-variable determinants (namely, Chechnya as a case of
ethnic/religious conflict, and Sierra Leone as a case of resource predation)
9See Sambanis (2004) for a discussion on the use of case studies to address multiple
levels of analysis.
10There are various issues associated with this approach discussed in the ‘Limitations’
section in Chapter Five.
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in order to capture the complexity and dynamism of the organizational
processes that lead to political violence. Moreover, insofar as these cases
do exhibit prototypical typological characteristics, testing them allows for
future cross-case comparisons.
Another important consideration is that cases are drawn from
opposite sides of the debates that are presented above in the literature
review. Sierra Leone can be characterized as an instance of greed, as a
non-ethnic conflict, and as a “new” war. Conversely, Chechnya can be
considered as a case of grievance, as an ethnic war, and as a conflict
that exhibits the characteristics of “old” wars. Thus, an analysis of
these cases not only tests the theoretical framework that is presented,
but also provides insight into the utility of these scholarly debates with
respect to recruitment and the organization of political violence. Ideally
the framework can be applied to cases that may lie at either side of
these typological dichotomies, thereby rendering the theory universally
applicable. Therefore, testing the framework with what may be considered
as ideal type cases to these debates, such as Chechnya and Sierra
Leone, serves as a legitimate means to assess the framework’s scope of
applicability.
Theoretical implications that result from the application of the
framework to the case studies, limitations of the project, and suggestions
for further research are discussed in detail in Chapter Five.
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1.5 Discussion of the results11
This section discusses briefly the results of the dissertation. The
dissertation reaches significant results in two different ways: one, by
the fact that the case study analyses support the hypotheses generated
by the theoretical framework, and two, by making contributions to the
understanding of both case studies that it examines, Chechnya and Sierra
Leone.
Both case studies exhibit significant within-case variation. In each
case, one of the two organizations of political violence under examination
positively supports the hypotheses of the framework, since it exhibits both
the antecedent and consequent conditions of the hypotheses. Moreover,
in each case, the other of the two organizations indirectly supports the
hypotheses, since it exhibits neither the antecedent nor the consequent
conditions of the hypotheses12.
The case study of Chechnya challenges the commonly-made
distinction between the two Wars that characterizes the First one as
an ethnonationalist war of independence and the Second one as an
Islamic “Holy War” that is part of a global jihad. Instead, the case study
presents the argument of an evolutionary conflict process. The changes
11This is a brief presentation of the results. There is a more extended discussion in
Chapter Five.
12The support is indirect since it is possible but cannot be confirmed. The lack of
both antecedent and consequent conditions may indicate support for an argument of the
co-existence of the antecedent and the consequent, but it also may be caused by other
factors unspecified in the statement of the argument. This issue is discussed in more
detail in the section on ‘Theoretical Implications’ in Chapter Five.
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that defined the conflict also altered the processes of the organization
of political violence and the recruitment strategies of the Chechen
resistance. Furthermore, the same transformation was evident in the
conduct of political violence as the conflict evolved.
The case study of Sierra Leone challenges the notion that the Sierra
Leonean civil war was simply a struggle over resource predation due to
the presence of lootable goods, namely alluvial diamonds. The case study
illustrates that the sociopolitical processes that led to the formation of
the Revolutionary United Front were complex and unrelated to resource
predation, at least at the nascent stage of organization. Moreover, the
formation of the Civil Defense Forces was a process completely divorced
from the purported causes of the conflict.
These results have implications, not only by testing the theoretical
framework proposed in this dissertation,but also by responding to
shortcomings that I identify in the literature. Future refinements and
applications of the framework can further illustrate the critical importance
of recruitment to our understanding of conflict processes and the
organization of political violence.
1.6 Outline of the dissertation
Chapter Two begins with an introduction of the concept of a Violent
Political Organization and its usage as the unit of analysis. The general
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statement of the collective action problem is presented, and then
reformulated to focus on the framework of interaction that characterizes
the collective action of organized political violence. This reformulation
illustrates the problems of the traditional solution to collective action
problems which is the provision of selective incentives to individual
participants. Elements from other literatures - the economic literature on
asymmetric information, the sociological literature on collective action,
and the emerging literature on social norms - are synthesized into
an alternative theoretical framework. The objective of the framework
is to explain the role of those elements in the collective action of
organized political violence. Finally, the chapter presents some observable
parameters and hypotheses that are used in evaluating the explanatory
power of the framework. That evaluation is in the form of the study of two
different cases in the chapters that follow.
Chapters Three and Four respectively present the case studies of
the project: the Russo-Chechen conflict and the Sierra Leonean civil war.
In each chapter, after a historical overview of the conflict, I present the
conditions in the sociopolitical environment of each case study that reflect
the parameters of the theoretical framework and the ways in which they
operate in that environment. Then, each chapter presents the analysis
of the organization of political violence and recruitment over the course
of the conflict. There are two units of analysis in each chapter: the
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organization of Chechen resistance in the First and Second Wars, and the
Revolutionary United Front and Civil Defense Forces in Sierra Leone.
Chapter Five concludes this dissertation with a summary discussion
of the results, some theoretical implications that are revealed through the






This chapter presents the general statement of the collective action
problem, applies that general framework to the organization of political
violence, surveys literatures of conceptual relevance, and presents an
alternative framework that brings these elements together by integrating
features from those literatures into the framework of collective action.
More specifically, in this chapter I build a logical progression
starting from the general account of collective action that identifies some
analytical puzzles which become more problematic once applied to the
specific framework for the organization of political violence. I then
illustrate the potential of information to obviate, or at least, supplement
the provision of selective incentives as a solution to the free-riding
problem of collective action. I present solutions suggested by economic
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models of asymmetric information, sociological models of the study of
social movements and organizations, and theoretical models of social
norm transmission. Finally, I synthesize elements from each of these
and present some observable hypotheses that will be tested through
application to case studies in subsequent chapters.
2.2 Introduction to Violent Political
Organizations
Violent Political Organizations (hereafter VPOs) are groups of individuals
that possess the ability to coordinate action within their operational
framework. They exhibit formal organizational power structure with
variability in the degree of centralization of power. They have
collectively formulated preferences and stated objectives but there can
be considerable incongruence between the two; in other words, their
preferences may extend beyond their stated objectives.
It should be noted that the specific outcome and collective good
that promotes free-riding within the operational framework on the part of
individuals is not by default the stated objective of a VPO. That outcome
is defined (and rendered a collective good) by the nature of strategic
interaction among the relevant actors within the framework, whereas the
stated objectives of the organization are declared by its core leadership.
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The composition of a VPO can be divided into three major
subgroups: the core leadership, active participants, and a support
network. Individually and collective, these are subgroups of the potential
pool of participants which in itself is a subgroup of the polity. The core
leadership represents the size of a VPO at its nascent stage; it consists of
those that frame its ideology and preferences, which they communicate
to potential participants. They define the behavior of the organization
and dictate the recruitment strategy that the organization will employ.
The subgroup of active participants includes all individuals who join the
organization and undertake violent action on its behalf. In hierarchical
terms, they stand below the core. Most significantly, this subgroup
includes those who specialize in the production of violence. Insofar as
the hierarchical structure of the VPO resembles that of an institutionalized
nation-state army1, the core may also - and frequently does - include
violence specialists. The Support Network may participate in a variety of
ways that may or may not involve physical interaction with the rest of the
VPO; for example, participation may involve logistical support, funding of
operations, or the dissemination of information.
1There are some benefits but also some disadvantages of such a structure; a strict
hierarchy facilitates organization, but the field strategy and tactics that the VPO employs
may benefit from a more diffuse decision-making power structure.
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2.3 A general statement of the collective action
problem
The canonical formulation of the collective action problem (Olson 1965)
holds that groups that aim to provide public goods, which are both
non-excludable and jointly supplied, should be unlikely to form solely
on the basis of providing the good. Infeasibility of exclusion means that
under normal circumstances no member of the group can be prevented
from enjoying the good once it is provided. Jointness of supply means that
the contribution of each individual member is of such small proportion to
the capacity of the entire group that no member can unilaterally provide
the good, thus necessitating the participation of the majority of possible
contributors.
As Olson (1965, 2) famously states: “[U]nless the number of
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest,
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests.” Thus, if the probability of successful provision is low then
individuals are better off not contributing at all since their contribution
is unlikely to sufficiently affect the likelihood of successful provision.
Therefore, a decision by an individual to contribute would be individually
irrational since he would incur some cost for no benefit. On the other
hand, if the probability of successful provision is high as a result of high
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participation, then an individual is better off free-riding and receiving the
collective benefit while others bear the cost of contribution. In this case,
any individual’s decision to participate would be individually irrational
since it would entail a higher cost for no additional gain.
The dominant strategy of this strategic interaction, which Ostrom
(2000, 137) refers to as “the zero-contribution thesis” is equivalent to
the mutual defection equilibrium of the famous matrix-form game of
Prisoner’s Dilemma, where rational, self-interested individuals forsake the
potential mutual gains from cooperation due to the strategic structure
of their interaction, which always makes it better for both to defect.
Hardin’s (1971) initial work on the collective action problem transformed
the 2-player matrix form version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game into
the interaction among all potential members of the group. Each
individual member-candidate was modeled as one player while the
other represented the rest of the group; each player - as per the
standard form of Prisoner’s Dilemma - had a binary choice set to
either cooperate or defect. Hardin’s (1982) later volume advanced the
field by presenting a more precise, n-player generalization of the game
that more accurately resembled the interaction among a large number
of rational, self-interested individuals. While the complexity of the
explanation progressed, the fundamental principles regarding the nature
of the players, the incentives provided to them as well as the strategic
impediments to cooperation remained constant. Ultimately, the logical
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conclusion of mutual (or, in this case, collective) defection persisted.2
However, as Ostrom (2000, 138) points out, the zero contribution thesis
contradicts everyday life. Thus, a satisfactory theory of collective action
needs to account for both group formation and recruitment of additional
members.
The solution that is implied in the above quote from Olson (either
coercion, in which case membership is involuntary, or some other special
device) has also persisted. Olson (1965, 51) states that in the absence of
coercion, only a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a rational
individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way as a way to
separate those who contribute from those who do not. Moreover, Olson
specifies that these incentives could be either positive or negative for
the targeted members, inducing contribution either by making it more
beneficial or by making abstention more costly. Much of the work that
has followed Olson’s paradigm, especially in political science, has focused
on the analysis of the forms that these selective incentives can take.3
I identify two fundamental problems with this approach. The first
is that the probability of successful group formation is not treated as a
continuum; rather, all analytical emphasis is placed at the extremes where
non-participation is certain. This suggests that the propensity of each
2The work of Robert Axelrod (see, among others, the following pioneering works: 1980,
1981, with William Hamilton 1981, 1984) has spawned a voluminous body of work aimed
at providing an answer to the question of which cooperative strategies can overcome the
problem of mutual defection.
3For example, Lichbach’s (1995) seminal account can be characterized as an
exhaustive categorization of selective incentives of collective dissent.
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potential member to participate is placed at neither probability extreme
but somewhere in between. In fact, the very possibility of selective
incentive provision necessitates a non-zero probability of success; if not,
then who is providing the incentives given that everyone is defecting?
Conversely, that probability cannot be equal to one since the group should
not be willing to expend resources on selective incentives that would not
yield a higher probability of successful provision anyway. Therefore, the
probability of successful provision must necessarily lie between the two
extremes.
The second - and much more significant in practical terms -
problem is that the provision of selective incentives necessitates some
pre-existing level of group cohesion. In this respect, it is somewhat
peculiar that the logical consequent of this framework is to argue that
under no circumstances will individuals be better off participating in
the absence of selective incentives. If those who provide the selective
incentives to future recruits were also the recipients of selective incentives
themselves, the problem is simply pushed to a higher order with the fear
of leading to an infinite regress. The possibility that they were coerced
begs the same question: if they were, then by whom? If they were not
the recipients of either selective incentives or victims of coercion, then
how did the group form to begin with? To present the problem in Olson’s
terms, how can it be that a latent group has the organizational capacity to
induce participation in either of these two ways? Conversely, if the group
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is not latent but active, then theories of collective action can only explain
recruitment but not group formation.
As a logical consequent, recruitment by a small, entrepreneurial
group at its nascent stage then becomes the crucial determinant of
successful provision. The question remains whether targeted selective
incentive provision is a sufficient condition to overcome the free-rider
problem. More importantly, is it a sufficient condition in the application
of this framework to phenomena of organized political violence? These
questions are addressed in the following section.
2.4 The collective action problem of organized
political violence
The previous section provides a general statement of the collective action
problem. In this section, that framework is examined in the form of a
theoretical application to the organization of political violence. The goal
is to illustrate that the specific parameters of the organization of political
violence differentiate the framework in some specific and systematic
ways such that the aforementioned solution of the provision of selective
incentives may be either insufficient or inapplicable and, therefore, needs
to be revised.
In the previous section it is shown that for each individual potential
participant, the decision to contribute is as follows:
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Expected Utility = Collective Good + Selective Incentives - Cost
For contribution to be individually rational in situations where
the conditions of infeasibility of exclusion and jointness of supply hold,
the value of selective incentives needs to at least equal the cost of
contribution. However, in the reformulation of the framework for cases of
organized political violence, there are two separate costs of contribution
for which each potential participant would need to account: the cost of
entry and the potential (and highly variable) cost of participation. The first
of the two is analogous to the cost as expressed in the general statement
of the problem presented in the previous section. The second is not
captured by that framework since the emphasis is on contribution as the
determinant of successful provision.
Yet insofar as the organization of political violence may be
characterized as a collective action problem, the intended outcome is
not achieved merely through successful organization. Achieving the
objective of politically oriented action is one possible outcome of a
conflict process and it is by no means assured. While the study of that
process is beyond the scope of this analysis, it is still crucial to consider
the risk that accompanies participation since it ought to be part of the
decision-making mechanism for each participant. Thus, I propose that
the decision to contribute should be reformulated to reflect this aspect in
the following way:
Expected Utility = Collective Good + Selective Incentives - (Cost + Risk)
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It should be obvious that, all other things being equal, the
reformulated expected total cost is higher than that in the original
formulation. As in the previous case, the value of selective incentives
needs to at least equal the expected total cost; therefore, it may be
concluded that the value of selective incentives necessary to induce
contribution will be higher in any situation where participation carries
some associated risk for the individual. It follows that the higher the
perception of risk, the less willing any individual will be to contribute and
the higher will be the value of selective incentives that will be necessary in
order to offset the difference.
The solution that is suggested by this reformulation seems fairly
simple: when aspiring organizations plan to engage in behavior that is
risky for their participants, they simply provide more selective incentives.
I argue that this suggestion, albeit logical, is problematic for a number of
reasons that are outlined below.
In the general form of the collective action problem the recruitment
strategy is maximum inclusion. Olson argues that “when there is
organized or coordinated effort in an inclusive group, as many as can
be persuaded to help will be included in that effort” (1965, 40). This
statement seems intuitively plausible, so would a VPO be expected to
simply maximize recruitment? After all, group size ought to have a
direct effect on the expected probability of success. I argue that the
inclusion of the risk factor differentiates that strategy. At any given
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point in time, an organization controls a specific amount of resources
which may or may not afford the organization the capacity to reach its
recruitment goals through the necessary provision of selective incentives.
If its existing capacity is sufficient for its goals, then this provision may
be all that is necessary. However, an organization looking to establish
itself at a nascent stage can be expected to be relatively small in size and
in control of relatively scarce resources. Assuming that those resources
are finite in the short run, then the task with which an organization
is faced can be characterized as a series of resource allocations over
time. The recruitment of one additional participant requires some portion
of those resources which exacerbates the resource drain imposed by
elevated selective incentive requirements, making the organization less
likely to satisfy its recruitment demands through the sole provision of
those incentives. This in turn suggests that such an organization would be
even less likely to follow a strategy of maximum inclusion. It is, therefore,
possible to face the seemingly paradoxical situation where supply exceeds
demand and the organization is faced with the problem of finding the right
individuals to participate.
The problem can be characterized as an informational asymmetry
of fitness: individuals may hold private information about their ability
to participate effectively. They may misrepresent that ability or they
may even have mistaken beliefs about their own fitness. This condition
may lead to adverse selection for the organization whereby the lack
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of credible information on the projected future performance of each
participant makes bad choices just as likely to occur as good ones.
Moreover, participants who engage in the provision of violence and
perform poorly by being captured, wounded, or killed can have a variety of
detrimental effects on the VPO: if captured they could provide confidential
information to the opposition or relinquish weaponry, if wounded, they
will represent an additional and unanticipated resource burden, if killed
the resources expended on preparing them for battle are wasted and they
will not be available for future contribution.4
Thus, the problems of asymmetric information and resource
scarcity exhibit feedback characteristics that exacerbate the overarching
problem of collective action. In light of this observation, provision of
selective incentives seems like a very costly mechanism for overcoming
the collective action problem. By and large, political scientists have not
paid sufficient attention to the role of information in collective action
frameworks. The work done by economists to provide solutions in this
area is outlined in the following section.
4The phenomenon of suicide terrorism presents an interesting exception to this
statement, since the success of such an operation largely relies on the death of a
combatant.
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2.5 Models of asymmetric information5
The modern literature on the economics of information has been largely
framed by the seminal work of George A. Akerlof, Michael Spence and
Joseph E. Stiglitz in the 1970s for which they were jointly awarded
the Sveriges Riksbank Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001.6 The field
is rooted in the assumptions that information is intrinsically valuable
as a determinant of market outcomes, and that sharing and acquiring
information is inherently costly. Broadly defined, a market failure of
asymmetric information is any situation where one party to a transaction
holds private information that directly affects the outcome of the
transaction. Depending on the nature of the information, the incentive
structure for either party may be affected positively or negatively.
The work of Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz defines the scope
of problems that may result from informational asymmetries and
mechanisms that can alleviate their effects. Akerlof’s (1970) seminal article
on the used car market defines the problem of adverse selection. In that
case the asymmetry exists between the seller and the buyer of a used
car with the former holding private information over whether the car in
question is a “lemon” (meaning defective in some way that is not readily
identifiable). The existence of both good cars and “lemons” on the market
5For an overview of these models and their impact on the growing field of information
economics, see Stiglitz 2000.
6For a historical survey of the groundwork that led to the development of this research
area as well as the field itself, see Stiglitz 2000.
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and buyers’ inability to distinguish between the two can have market-wide
repercussions. If there were two separate markets for good and bad cars
then two separate price points would be set with the price for good ones
being obviously the higher of the two. But since there is only one market
and buyers cannot be certain of the quality of any particular car then a
Pareto suboptimal price will be set that tends to undervalue good cars and
overvalue “lemons”.
The Spence and the Rothschild-Stiglitz models provide
self-selection mechanisms through which market agents can credibly
reveal private information thereby alleviating the effects of adverse
selection. Spence’s (1973; 1974) approach relies on high quality agents
differentiating themselves from low quality agents through the use of
costly signaling. For the signal to be credible it must be sufficiently
costly that low quality agents would be either unable or unwilling to
undertake the cost. Spence uses education as the signal that potential
employees send to potential employers. The Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)
model approaches the problem from the side of uninformed agents
by analyzing what they can do to improve the outcome through the
inducement of self-selection by the agents who hold private information.
The example used is the insurance market; similarly to the uninformed
buyers in Akerlof’s model and the uninformed employers in Spence’s
model, Rothschild and Stiglitz investigate the potential for insurance
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companies to differentiate between high-risk (i.e. low-quality) and
low-risk (i.e. high-quality) individuals.
The problem of asymmetric information has been all but ignored
by the political science literature on the organization of violence. In the
only other account that provides a theoretical model as a solution to this
problem, Weinstein (2005; 2007) models the process as an organizational
task of hiring by characterizing combatants as “job applicants”. Similarly
to the Spence model, individuals undertake contractual commitment as
a promise to illustrate their quality over time. High-quality individuals
are more likely to make the commitment than opportunistic low-quality
individuals who are bluffing since they are more likely to perform
successfully. Moreover, as payoffs from participation are deferred to
the future - by which time the level of quality is revealed through
actual performance of combat-related tasks - the rewards of bluffing are
minimized.
Weinstein’s characterization of the problem is similar to the one
presented here. Both highlight the significance of the informational
asymmetry built into the interaction between the core leadership of a
VPO and its pool of potential participants. Both approaches assign
information-revealing value to community-wide institutions. Ultimately,
the two approaches differ on the degree to which they prioritize this
aspect of the framework. In the theoretical framework that I present, the
role of social norms and social networks in providing information and
45
constraining the repertoire of actions available to potential participants
is much more pronounced. Moreover, the Weinstein model hinges on
participants’ inclination towards future deference of private rewards.
While that is a significant contribution in itself with testable empirical
implications, it exhibits two shortcomings: 1) it keeps the analytical focus
on the provision of selective incentives, and 2) it may be an unnecessary
consideration for VPOs if the effect of social norms and social networks is
sufficient to sustain a desirable recruitment strategy.
The Weinstein model is a valuable contribution to the literature
on the organization of political violence. There is a small but growing
movement in the literature towards the exploration of micro variables
rather than a reliance on broad categories of causation or statistical
analyses of global and long-term trends which have been the mainstays
for some time. Very little of that is directly focused on analyzing the
determinants and implications of recruitment. It is precisely in this area
that this theoretical framework is situated.
2.6 Alternative theoretical framework
In the rest of a chapter, I present a new approach that shifts emphasis
from the provision of selective incentives to the facilitating role that social
46
norms and social networks play in the organization of political violence,
especially in terms of shaping recruitment strategies7.
VPOs do not operate in a vacuum; they are products of the
sociopolitical environment within which they operate. On the basis
of this practical observation, I argue that VPOs can utilize the existing
social norms and social networks of their environment in order to
optimize recruitment by alleviating the inherent problems of asymmetric
information. Social norms and social networks can serve as mechanisms
that reveal information about individual recruits. Thus, they can
help alleviate problems of asymmetric information as well as guide
distributional decision-making processes. Moreover, a social network
can help minimize free-riding by enforcing contribution through existing
social norms.
In the sections that follow I present a review of the literatures on
social networks and social norms that analyze the conceptual foundations
of the alternative theoretical framework that I propose. Then, the concepts
are combined to set the parameters for operationalizing the framework in
the study of individual case studies.
7In other words, the provision of selective incentives is still incorporated into this
approach but simply not the sole focal point.
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2.7 Sociological literature on collective action
2.7.1 Literature on social movements8
The analysis of collective behavior (of which the analysis of violent
collective behavior is a subset) has been a mainstay of sociological
scholarship since the structural-functionalist school of thought that was
preeminent in the 1960s. According to this paradigm, shifts in social
transformations (especially at abrupt intervals of sweeping changes)
resulted in a by-product of collective action. Social movements were
therefore seen as pathologies, or as crises/challenges to the existing social
framework due to the inability of social institutions to mitigate social
discord. In addition, psychologically grounded theories in this tradition
portrayed collective behavior as the result of feelings of deprivation and/or
marginalization on the part of individuals guiding their decision-making
process to participate. There is an obvious conceptual link between
general structural theories of collective behavior and early theories of
protest and revolution as a direct result of grievance accumulation such
as the work of Ted Gurr9. The latter relied on the concept of shared
grievances leading to the formulation of a shared ideological core and then
to collective behavior in the form of sociopolitical movements that aim
to address those grievances. Moreover, the recent debate over the causal
8For historical overviews of the literature on social movements see McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly (2001, 38-71) and Della Porta and Diani (2006).
9See Gurr (1970) for the foundations; for an updated formulation see Gurr (2000).
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mechanisms of civil war onset as a dichotomy of greed or grievance can be
framed as the theoretical consequent of the same foundations.
In contrast to such structural approaches, there are a number of
approaches that can be broadly categorized under the analytical umbrella
of assuming rationality, purposeful action, and organizational capacity
on the part of social movements. One major theoretical strand in
this tradition is the resource-mobilization paradigm, emphasizing the
presence of opportunities for collective behavior and the organizational
capability to mobilize. The term is largely attributed to the work of
McCarthy and Zald (see, inter alia, 1977) which shifted the focus away
from the social psychology of collective behavior towards a more explicitly
sociopolitical framework of organization that places the aggregation of
resources (more specifically, labor and capital) at its core.
2.7.2 Literature on social networks
Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl (1988) examine the link between the strength
of a pre-existing social network and the ability of an organization to
overcome collective action free-riding problems. They find that the
higher the density of pre-existing social ties the better the prospects
for undertaking collective action. Moreover, they also find that the
centralization of network ties always has a positive effect on collective
action and that the costs associated with organization are proportional
to group heterogeneity; as the organization draws from a more
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homogeneous pool, it can identify and selectively recruit individuals with
a higher probability of overall contribution.
Gould (1993) re-iterates the primacy of the centralization of network
ties on organizational strength and successful collective action but also
focuses on the structural positions of individual contributors on the
overall level of contribution. He concludes that individual contribution is
routed through norms, efficacy concerns, and social structures. McAdam
and Paulsen (1993) provide a framework for recruitment on the basis
of four fundamental conditions that are largely similar to concepts
outlined above. They argue that successful recruitment requires a specific
recruitment attempt, a linkage between the prospective recruits identity
and participation (ideological and/or goal-oriented), a support network
that can sustain and reinforce that specific linkage, and the absence of
countervailing linkages to other salient identities.
The idea of placing particular attention to the formulation and
intricacies of selective incentives and disincentives is nothing new. Oliver
(1980) makes the argument that positive and negative incentives are
analytically dissimilar because the relationship between individual cost
and group size is variable. She concludes that “negative incentives
are essential for ensuring unanimous cooperation in costly collective
action” (1980, 1373). Snow et al. highlight “the importance of social
networks as a conduit for the spread of social movements” (1980, 790).
They find that the probability of recruitment is largely determined
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by preexisting interpersonal ties between existing group members and
prospective recruits and the existence or absence of competing networks.
Klandermans and Oegema (1987) identify the four fundamental aspects
of mobilization as: mobilization potential, or the subset of people who
could be mobilized within a society that stands to gain by achievement of
the movements goals, recruitment networks that reach individuals within
that subset, motivation to participate at the individual level as a function
of perceived costs and benefits associated with participation, and the
barriers to participation.
McAdam (1983, 735) emphasizes the need for shifting emphasis
away from the analysis of origins and causes of insurgency (typically
rendered static by the analytical tools employed) towards a more
dynamic approach that highlights movement development and decline.
Klandermans (1984) draws attention to a fundamental feature of the
social dilemma faced by potential contributors to a collective benefit;
that at the specific moment of making the decision to participate, each
participant has expectations about the likely actions of every other
potential participant (and uses those expectations to formulate their own
cost-benefit analysis and estimate their own utility from participation)
but is ultimately uncertain about the actual overall level of participation.
Thus, Klandermans reformulates the collective action problem as a
coordination dilemma; individuals will be more willing to participate if
they expect others will do likewise. Thus, membership in a preexisting
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social network that facilitates the dissemination of information, thereby
converging expected outcomes and actual ones, increases the likelihood
of successful mobilization with both the collective and the selective
incentives from cooperation held constant. Conversely, Oliver (1984)
analyzes a framework where there are diminishing marginal returns
from contribution to a collective good (a property which is inversely
proportional to the overall size of the participation population; for
example, participation in neighborhood collective goods) such that initial
contributions make a marked and easily perceivable difference and
subsequent contributions have increasingly less significant impact. She
argues that in such cases, “rational individuals take account of the
likelihood that the collective good will be provided through the efforts of
others, and they are less likely to contribute the more they believe others
will” (1984, 609).
McAdam (1986) makes the crucial distinction between participation
in low- and high-risk activism. Furthermore, he emphasizes the
importance of pre-existing supportive networks and the prominent role
of ideological inclination among group members as well as prior history
of activism.
Snow et al. (1986, 464) argue that frame alignment - defined as
the linkage between the “interpretive orientations” of individuals and
Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) “such that some set of individual
interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goal and ideology
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are congruent and complementary” - is a necessary precondition for
participation. Therefore, success in mobilization requires the utilization
of preexisting linkages, the alteration of such linkages to suit an emergent
political identity, the generation of new linkages, or a combination of the
above.
2.8 Literature on social norms
The theoretical literature on social norms as explanatory variables for
collective action lies at the nexus of various research areas. It includes
work done by theoretical economists, game theorists, evolutionary
biologists, anthropologists, sociologists as well as political scientists.
Comparatively speaking, political science represents the least of the bulk
of this work. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004, 185) two of the leading figures
in this research area define social norms as “standards of behavior that
are based on widely shared beliefs [about] how individual group members
ought to behave in a given situation” and, of course, that definition
presupposes that failure to act in accordance with the norm is subject
to punishment. In terms of overcoming the collective action problem,
social norms are considered essential because in the absence of some
norm that deviates from what is known as rational egoism in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game the dominant strategy will always be that of mutual
defection. In other words, for players to have an incentive to deviate
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from the dominant strategy there must be an overriding principle to which
they adhere such as ‘you should not free-ride and take advantage of your
fellow members.’ While strict adherence to such deontological principles
would be sufficient to shift the outcome from the equilibrium of mutual
defection to mutual cooperation, it is rarely the case that social norms are
obeyed solely due to their moral force.
The most consistent approach towards understanding human
cooperation through social norms is through the norm of conditional
cooperation. Conditionality specifically refers to the maxim of ‘cooperate
if others cooperate, defect if others defect.’ In other words, the heuristic
algorithm at work is to reciprocate the behavior of others regardless of
whether it is positive or negative.10 Early efforts that focused on this norm
emphasized either kinship (Hamilton 1964) or reciprocity11 (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971). However, as Boyd and Richerson (1988)
illustrate, these mechanisms are insufficient to maintain cooperation as
group membership rises beyond small groups.12 Consequently, many new
10There is some procedural ambiguity in this framing, since it implies that
decision-making is sequential, while most discussions based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma
assume simultaneity. However, it is also the case that a framework of social norms can
only operate through iteration, which suggests that this is a learning process through
the revelation of previously private information about other players’ preferences which is
consistent with the theoretical device of the n-player iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
By iterated, we mean that the game is repeated a number of times that is unknown to the
players, in which case backwards induction (figuring out what to do the last time, and the
penultimate time, and so on) is insufficient for them to devise a dominant strategy.
11It should be noted that many theorists use tit-for-tat (usually shortened to TFT),
reciprocity, reciprocal altruism and conditional cooperation interchangeably.
12This relationship is exponentially inverse to group size as it increases from 10 to 100
to 1000 members and beyond.
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approaches have been introduced in the attempt to explain specifically
human sociality, since cooperation in this sphere occurs in very large
numbers among largely unrelated individuals. Nowak and Sigmund (1993)
argue that a strategy of ‘Win-Stay, Lose-Shift’ outperforms ‘Tit-for-Tat’
in the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game.13 The strategy entails that
those who do badly are able to observe those who do better and adopt
their strategies accordingly over time. This development has led to the
consideration of mechanisms of social learning that facilitate the adoption
of common and successful behaviors.
The two most common themes in this research area are the
concepts of payoff-biased (Bowles 2004) or, relatedly, prestige-biased
transmission (Henrich and Gil-White 2001) and conformist transmission
(Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich and Boyd 1998). The first two are
roughly analogous to the social rule of “copy those that you observe to be
successful” (hence the emphasis on higher payoffs and prestige) and the
latter to “copy what the majority does.”14 The most significant difference
between the two is that while conformity may be regarded as a public good
in itself (where individuals have an incentive to free-ride), the pursuit of
higher payoffs and/or prestige may lead to within-group competition due
to scarcity. This is especially true in the case of prestige which may be
13The ‘Win-Stay, Lose-Shift’ strategy is usually referred to as ‘Pavlov’ due to the
conditional learning that the strategy involves.
14Note that conformist transmission is not the same as normative conformity which is
adopting the conventional choice so as to avoid potential consequences by standing out;
rather, conformist transmission assumes that the popularity of a choice is assessed as an
indirect measure of its worth, thereby resulting in its adoption.
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considered as a positional good, hence the more one possesses within a
finite population, the less everyone else may possess in relation to that
individual. Thus, cooperation in such cases is not evolutionary stable
(Henrich and Boyd 2001, 81).
Two solutions to the problem of evolutionary instability in culturally
transmitted social norms have dominated recent scholarship: costly
signaling and punishment. Both concepts are based on the idea that
mechanisms that are individually costly can be mutually or collectively
beneficial (Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003). According to Gintis,
Smith, and Bowles (2001, 103) costly signaling constitutes an honest signal
of the member’s quality, and therefore results in advantageous alliances
for those signaling in this manner.15 The quality that is being revealed
can be either cooperative or competitive; in other words, a member
may reveal information about his fitness as a partner or as a competitor.
Either way, revealing information ought to decrease transaction costs
that would otherwise be incurred through experimentation in both the
selection mechanism and the selection itself. The authors assert that
the collective benefit of the mechanism is powerful enough that it can
overcome the collective action problem even without repetition or other
associative attributes such as the relative extent of kinship. They show that
15The authors define quality as those attributes that are neither immediately apparent
(i.e. they constitute private information) nor easily assessed (i.e. even if one claims to
possess these qualities, it may simply be ‘cheap-talk’) but have a significant effect on the
payoffs from social interaction.
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non-cooperation becomes a sub-optimal strategy when signaling benefits
are incorporated into the interaction.
This modeling process accurately captures the dynamics involved
in group membership for the pursuit of political goals through the
use of organized violence (and the authors seem to agree since they
propose group raiding or defense as possible applications). In fact,
performance in warfare is the public good provided by active participants
as a way of proving their worth. Interestingly enough, the provision
of this good is central to the provision of the higher-order public
goods game in which the group aims at achieving its political goals
which in itself is the primary collective action problem. There are
some striking similarities between this framework and the theoretical
models of overcoming adverse selection problems due to asymmetric
information presented above. High Quality Signalers should have lower
marginal costs of signaling, since they should be better at performing
the provision of the public good once asked to do so. Therefore,
bluffing is discouraged by coupling performance to reputation. Costly
signaling provides an evolutionary stable equilibrium when: high-quality
individuals are neither too common (which would render the mechanism
of little consequence) or too rare (which would render the mechanism cost
ineffective), and the cost of signaling is sufficiently marginally lower for
high-quality individuals than for low-quality individuals.
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The second major category of solutions is the punishment of
defection through selectively targeted sanctions. There is considerable
experimental evidence (Fehr and Gachter 2000; 2002; Yamagishi 1986;
1988) suggesting that the credible threat of third-party sanctions has a
considerable effect on eliminating defection. However, the literature on
sanctions has spawned an interesting offshoot in trying to explain the
motives behind sanctions. Briefly, the argument is that the credibility of
the threat of sanctions is a public goods problem in itself, in the sense
that if the threat is credible no punisher has the incentive to actually
contribute to its provision. This, therefore, leads to a second-order
social dilemma where punishment of non-punishers is needed in order to
secure the punishment of defectors. Naturally, this leads to an nth-order
similar problem leading to an infinite regress whereby higher levels of
monitoring of lower orders are always required. Two solutions to the
problem are: 1) that a combination of payoff-biased and conformist
transmission stabilizes punishment at some specific nth-order depending
on the parameters of the interaction (Henrich and Boyd 2001); and 2) that
sanctions are non-selfish in the strict sense of self-interest. The second of
the two has led to a somewhat controversial initiative, whose findings are
by no means universally accepted, to establish the innate characteristics
of humans that lead to the meta-level social norm of punishment as a
strong preference. For example, Carlsmith and Darley (2002) argue that
just desert is a much more powerful motive than deterrence in human
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propensity to punishment.16 Other approaches model the propensity
towards fairness (Rabin 1993) or spitefulness (Rabin 1998) as driving forces
for punishers to act. Interestingly, neurobiological experiments (Rilling et
al. 2002; Sanfey et al. 2003) report findings that are consistent with the
assumptions of these models. The same experiments also suggest that
emotions may also play a decisive role in such decision-making processes.
2.9 Norms, networks, and information
Beyond the problems already identified above, the most significant
shortcoming of traditional accounts of collective action is inefficiency;
they do not distinguish between potential participants, therefore not
allowing for the potential to differentiate in terms of quality and thus
concluding that selective incentives are both necessary and singular as a
requirement for successful cooperation. Information can fundamentally
alter the internal dynamic of the interaction by allowing for this
differentiation. Models of asymmetric information address this problem
in an attempt to reduce inefficiency and optimize recruitment into
collective groups. The usage of social network analysis in sociology
of movements and organizations provides social-based applications of
these mechanisms. Models of social norm transmission employ a similar
16The argument is much more controversial in other applications; for example, capital
punishment may be justified as being merely an appropriate punishment even if it has
no deterrent effect. The argument is still relevant to my research agenda, though, since
appeals to just desert can mobilize participation.
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rationale in explaining formation, propagation and monitoring standards
of behavior that make cooperation mutually beneficial. This section
applies this theoretical progression to a framework intended for specific
application to recruitment by VPOs.
Theoretical conceptualizations of group-level cooperation are
generally abstract and not necessary manifested in real life applications.
As stated above, norms as exhibited in human society must necessarily
overcome the problem of large numbers where transmission of the
norms may not be monitored in strict and absolute terms but in vague
general terms, for example as long-standing traditions rather than explicit
standards of behavior. The most important consideration for this study is
whether rules of conduct constrain behavior in significant and observable
long-term patterns. After all, the focus of this study is not the emergence
of such norms, their specificity, or the rationale for their choice over
other competing norms. Rather, the focus is on their effect on the
ability of societal sub-groups to organize themselves and recruit other
members of their society to engage in behavior that is beneficial to the
sub-group. Thus, the parameter of measurement is the instrumental
usage of pre-existing social norms by organizations of political violence.
The extent to which VPOs will be able to use the norms to facilitate
recruitment is largely beyond their control, since the specific nature of
the norms is the result of long-term societal evolutionary processes and
unlikely to be transformable in the short-run. However, in the short-run
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they may very well be malleable in specific ways that VPOs can utilize to
reframe long-standing patterns of behavior to their own ends17.
Both solutions (costly signaling and punishment) provided by the
social norms literature to the problem of evolutionary instability equilibria
of what are essentially large-scale public goods games should be directly
observable in practical applications of the theoretical framework. As
already stated, the theoretical concepts of costly signaling in social
norm transmission and asymmetric information models bear remarkable
conceptual resemblance. Their application to theories of organized
political violence is relatively straightforward.
In the theoretical framework that I propose, recruits are the
signalers who signal their quality as fighters to the organization. The
organization would like to expend as few resources as possible on finding
the recruits since those resources will be better utilized by limiting their
expenditure to those who become active combatants. In addition, since
monitoring is costly, it should be the case that the organization will try
to minimize the cost of monitoring both recruits and active combatants.
If the organization can accomplish this by using information already
available within the social network, then it can lower both its recruiting
costs and its operational costs. At the same time, the level of cohesion
of the social network has an effect on the probability that low quality
17The same logic permeates work on the opportunities for ethnonationalist persuasion
that democratization and insecurity afford to political elites; see de Figueiredo and
Weingast (1999) and Snyder (2000).
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recruits will bluff; the more cohesive the social network, the lower the
probability of dishonest signaling since more information is available on
each potential recruit. As already stated, since the tasks that recruits will
be asked to perform as members are combat-related, it is very difficult
to assess them based on past performance even with a social network
to provide information. Except for the case of recurrence of war, most
combatants will not have participated in these tasks, especially since
most of the targeted recruits are likely to be young males. Thus, the
degree to which long-standing traditions of social norms that exhibit
combat-related characteristics affects the availability of information to
VPOs that is directly applicable to successful recruitment.
Moreover, the degree to which monitoring of how such norms
function in a specific sociopolitical environment can be utilized by
VPOs for the purposes of recruitment - and also operational monitoring
and evaluation of performance - is largely dependent upon the specific
structural characteristic of the social network. The structure of the
network can account for variation along the following parameters: the
dissemination of information, the efficiency in coordination among
its members, the adaptation of strategies and tactics over time, the




The analysis presented above yields some hypotheses to be stated through
application to specific case studies in the following chapters.
Hypothesis 1: Broad social norms of expected behavior make both the
organization and conduct of political violence less costly.
The extent to which rules of conduct permeate the sociopolitical
environment within which VPOs operate may favor both recruitment
and operation by: facilitating monitoring and enforcement,
discouraging defection from participation, and discouraging
deviation from expected behavior within society at large, even
beyond those actively involved in the organization.
Hypothesis 2: Traditions that favor characteristics of combat-related
behavior make the organization of political violence less costly.
More specifically, social norms that constrain behavior in ways that
are easily transferable to combat favor VPOs in a variety of ways: they
reveal fitness information of individuals, reduce transaction costs,
discourage bluffing, and minimize resource expenditure.
Hypothesis 3: The structure of the social network affects both of the
above.
The structure of the social network defines the way in which these
mechanisms work in a specific sociopolitical environment. The
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strength of social ties, closeness of network sub-groups, and the
relationship between the structure of the network and the structure
of VPO are significant determinants of the ability of the VPO to
constrain the behavior of both its potential and active participants.
2.10 Conclusion
This chapter presents an alternative framework for defining and
understanding the recruitment mechanisms of organizations of political
violence. The framework critiques traditional accounts of collective
action and integrates various conceptual elements from other theoretical
literatures to provide solutions to existing limitations. In the following
chapters, the hypotheses presented above are tested through application
to case study analyses of the organization of political violence in the





The Russo-Chechen War can serve as an illustrative example of many
important observed trends that have concerned political scientists in
recent years. It can be characterized as: a case study of secessionist
movement for self-determination (Bowker 2004; Khalilov 2003; Wood
2007), a case study of ethnic conflict within the broader context of the
post-Cold War Era (Williams 2001), a case study of transnational terrorism
within the context of the ‘War on Terror’ (Alexseev 2002; Cornell 2003), or
simply as a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in Huntington’s (1992; 1996) framework
that has had broader appeal and acceptance within the political sphere in
the post-9/11 world1.
1See Cornell (1998) for a challenge to the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ interpretation of the
conflicts in the Caucasus region.
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Furthermore, the underlying causes of the conflict can be (and have
been) described using a variety of theoretical frameworks: as the result
of the political transformation of the Russian elite in the aftermath of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union (Gall and de Waal 1998), as an effect of
the contestation over regional geopolitics of oil and other concerns in
the greater Caucasus region (Baev, Koehler and Zurcher 2002; Cheterian
2001), as the outcome of the relationship between Russian and Chechen
leaders with an emphasis on personal animosities (Dunlop 1998), or as the
byproduct of political corruption on both sides (McFaul 2000). Evidently,
there is no shortage of explanations as to the causal mechanisms that led
to the outbreak of the conflict.
This chapter focuses primarily on a specific aspect of the conflict
that has been broadly characterized as a transformation from nationalism
in the First War to jihad in the Second War2. The chapter presents
the argument that the conflict did not simply change in the inter-war
period but that it evolved throughout the entire process3. In other
2I use the labels First and Second Russo-Chechen Wars following convention within
the literature. The First War describes the period between December 1994 and August
1996 as the starting and ending points of armed conflict, even though the formal peace
treaty was signed in May 1997. The specific dates of the Second War are harder to
define but common convention points to the second Russian invasion of Chechnya in
September 1999 as the starting point and, of course, the ending point has yet to be
reached. Many analysts, including the majority of the Chechen population, reject the
above formulation and regard the war as one continuous process. While I tend to prefer
this approach in terms of a more comprehensive analysis of the conflict, I will retain the
separation of the two periods as a way to illustrate changes in strategies, tactics, and
recruitment patterns between the First War and Second War period.
3See Hughes (2001; 2007) for a broader interpretation of the causes of the two Wars
that reaches the same conclusions.
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words, the conflict can be understood as two episodes of one drawn-out
confrontation where some attributes that drove the organization of
political violence waxed or waned in significance over time. Therefore,
while the commonly-made distinction between the two Wars - that
characterizes the First as a nationalist war of independence and the
Second as a “Holy War” - is useful, it can create the misleading impression
of two distinct and fundamentally different processes. The chapter
presents the argument that the elements that defined the religious
character of the Second War either resulted from the First War (directly
or indirectly), or were actually in place during the First War but had not
yet become defining characteristics.
3.2 Historical overview of the conflict
The breakdown of the Soviet Empire in December of 1991, following
a three-year period of reforms enacted by the Secretary General
of the Communist Party of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, finalized
the establishment of independence of the fifteen former constituent
republics. While the process of dissolution had been marked by increasing
claims to sovereignty within each constituent republic during the
transitional period, the end result was by and large politically stable and
remarkably bloodless. Some conflicts did flare in the regional reordering
of borders, most notably the secessionist struggles of Abkhazia and South
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Ossetia within the newly-established state of Georgia, and the conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Yet, by and large, the reconfigured Russian Federation enjoyed a process
of largely peaceful transition.4
Even though the emerging political order in Moscow was seen
as considerably weakened in relation to the former stronghold of the
Supreme Soviet, the blueprint for claims to independence that the
process of dissolution provided did not translate into widespread appeals
to self-determination among the autonomous republics except for one
crucial case, that of Chechnya.5 With tragic repercussions felt far
beyond the relatively narrow borders of Chechnya, the Russo-Chechen
conflict remains unresolved to this day. It has resulted in destabilizing
tendencies throughout the Caucasus and especially in the neighboring
republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia, and has been both cause and
effect of political machinations in Moscow that have lead to the rise
and fall of many prominent figures, none more spectacular than the
meteoric rise of Vladimir Putin. Tragically, Chechnya has also served as
international spectacle of a macabre theater of human suffering after years
of horrendous human rights violations by both sides. While the Chechen
4The Russian Federation consisted of Russia and the autonomous republics of the
former Russian SFSR (Soviet Federated Socialist Republic): Bashkortostan, Buryatia,
Chechnya and Ingushetia, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karelia,
Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, North Ossetia-Alania, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia, and Sakha
(Yakutia).
5Vladimir Putin would later revitalize the theory that a secession would lead to a
post-Soviet domino effect in reference to Chechnya.
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state retains a patina of de facto independence, internal divisions, a
stagnant economy ravaged by the war as well as rampant corruption, and
the extended disruption of most provisions of public goods and services
continue to subject the Chechen population to a life of hardship and
diminished future prospects.6
Opposition to Russian authority coalesced around the person (and
persona) of General Dzhokhar Dudayev, a product of the Soviet Red
Army who was married to an ethnic Russian and for years had concealed
his Chechen identity and heritage. In light of this fact, Dudayev’s
transformation into a staunch nationalist is all the more remarkable
and points to what many have characterized as Dudayev’s selective and
instrumental assumption of a new identity. In line with this hard-line
approach was the instrumental usage of the historical past - by portraying
the continued coexistence between Chechnya and Russia as untenable
based on a long history of conflict - as a catalyst for war by Dudayev as
well as others who adopted this approach and came to lead the drive
for self-determination. Thus, the Chechen leadership was able to shift
emphasis from the proximate causes of the war to characterizing the
present outbreak as merely the latest episode in a long-standing conflict
that had been waging for more than three centuries.
While the claim is tenuous at best and was clearly intended to
provide the necessary focal point and rally-cry for coordination, a look at
6For a report on the problematic process of post-conflict reconstruction in Chechnya,
see Tishkov 2000.
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the historical record seemed to validate the claim in the eyes of Chechens,
especially in the case of a nation as bound by historical collective memory
as Chechnya. The history of Russo-Chechen relations is littered with
episodes that came to define a pattern of interaction that carried over
into the present conflict; ill-fated Russian attempts to invade and civilize
the barbaric highlander Chechens provoked overwhelming responses
that bordered on the barbaric, in turn reinforcing the Russian image of
Chechens. However, for Chechens, these episodes solidified into a form of
lore that came to define their social interactions especially with regards to
the exhibition of leadership; one common characteristic in all cases was a
figure that combined military prowess, religious fervor and strengthening
of ethnic ties. Sheikh Mansur’s rout of Catherine the Great’s invading
forces in 1785 represents the first such incident.7
The relationship between Muslims and Soviet leadership was
tenuous throughout the Soviet era. The promises of the Communist
doctrine of separation of church and state, respect for all religions,
and integration on the basis of a common sociopolitical ethos that
transcended ethnic and religious cleavages never fully materialized. In
fact, no episode of strife left a more indelible mark on the collective
memory of Chechens and the sentiment of Russian subjugation than
the deportations carried out by the Stalinist regime in 1944. The effects
7It is an interesting recurring trend that these figures that rise to nearly mythical status
tend to have uncertain pasts. Little is known of Sheikh Mansur’s past, not even if he was
actually a Chechen. Even his name was assumed (it translates to ‘Victorious’); his real
name was Ushurma.
70
of the deportations are still analyzed today and for good reason. The
dispersal of Chechens throughout the former Soviet Empire led to the
creation of a Chechen diaspora since many Chechens never returned.
Ties to the motherland were strengthened through a sense of shared
suffering, and a strengthened animosity and mistrust of Russian authority
has never subsided since. As a result, appeals to history by Dudayev and
other Chechen nationalists in the early 1990s were not met with much
resistance. (See Williams 2000)
3.2.1 The First Russo-Chechen War8
As described in the previous section. the autonomous republic of
Chechen-Ingushetia declared its secession amidst the collapse of the
Soviet Union in September 1991. Under the leadership of Dzhokhar
Dudayev, the Chechen Republic of Ingushetia achieved de facto
independence without the recognition of the Russian government. After
a period of protracted negotiations that resulted in a series of breakdowns
the First Chechen War began in December 1994 with the Russian invasion
of Chechnya. Meanwhile, Dudayev’s stronghold on power had been
consolidated over the past three years after decisive crushes of opposing
factions.
8There are many good historical accounts of the conflict; Gall and de Waal’s (1998)
remains the authoritative source on the First War, while Tishkov (2004) incorporates the
inter-war period and the lead-up to the Second War.
71
Russia’s expectation in entering the war was a quick and decisive
victory; the vastly superior resources of the Russian Army were in no way
comparable to the limited firepower of the newly established breakaway
state whose hardware mainly consisted of requisitioned Soviet materiel.
Top Kremlin officials such as Oleg Bolov (Secretary of the Kremlin Security
Council) referred to the upcoming campaign as a “short victorious war”
in allusion to a statement made in 1904 by the Russian Minister of
the Interior Vyacheslav Plehve in reference to the Russo-Japanese War
that was intended to avert the Russian Revolution; the war ended in
catastrophe for the Russian Army and, contrary to expectation, fueled
rather than abetted popular unrest. The tragic irony of the analogy may
have been lost on Lobov at the time, but its portentous foreshadowing
would soon become apparent. Perhaps as a result of overoptimism,
the Russian Army was ill-prepared for what lay ahead; the guerrilla
warfare that ensued favored the highly-mobile self-contained bands of
Chechen fighters over the sluggish mechanized Russian Army. As the
conflict dragged on, the Russian Army’s response to the humiliating
losses - especially to what was perceived as a much inferior force - was
an overwhelming one; regular carpet bombing air strikes and artillery
shelling resulted in indiscriminate casualties among both Chechen and
Russian non-combatants.
On New Year’s Eve of 1995, heavy Russian bombardment of the
capital city of Grozny marked the opening salvo in the First Battle of
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Grozny. Moving into the city with Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)
and mechanized infantry, the Russians were stunned by bitter opposition.
Not only did the resistance come from the Chechen regulars under the
command of former Soviet Colonel (and later Chechen President) Aslan
Maskhadov but also - and perhaps most significantly - from irregular
militias that operated covertly and independently in urban guerrilla
warfare. That first Russian foray into Grozny had devastating effects
that were to shape the ensuing conflict in significant ways. First of
all, it destroyed the initial estimation that a quick and decisive victory
was possible and any potential exuberance that went along with that
overoptimism. Moreover, the inability of the Russian forces to fight the
Chechens on the ground had an immediate demoralizing effect on troops
that did not seem to be convinced of the necessity of this war to begin with.
The mounting numbers of civilian casualties polarized public opinion
within Russia and throughout the world as international observers looked
on in disbelief, and it galvanized Chechen public opinion into a relatively
unified oppositional force. After a hasty retreat from the Chechen capital
to cut their losses, the Russians responded with a protracted barrage of
bombardments over the next few months. Unwilling, and indeed unable,
to face the Russian Army in open battle, Dudayev’s forces also pulled out
of the city and into more mountainous terrain; Russia assumed control of
the city on March 7 of 1995.
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During the rest of the conflict the Chechen forces increasingly
retreated to the Southern part of Chechnya where mountainous terrain
facilitated the use of ambush tactics with small mobile units. Both sides
relied increasingly on the strategies that proved to work best for them;
the Russians on heavy bombardments and air strikes, the Chechens on
guerrilla tactics both within urban areas and through quick strikes and
retreats from mountainous outposts. As casualties escalated, so did the
ferocity of the tactics. Russian strikes became increasingly indiscriminate,
amidst growing allegations of human rights abuses against Chechen
civilians. The Chechens adopted terrorist tactics such as hostage taking
and beheading of prisoners. Concurrently, the conflict assumed an
increasingly religious tone with frequent pronouncements of Jihad against
the invading Federal forces. The first terrorist attack that had a profound
and lasting impact on the course of events was the Budyonnovsk crisis
of June 14-18 of 1995. Shamil Basayev, Chechen leader of the ‘Abkhaz
Battalion’, so-named due to its participation in the Abkhaz secession
movement from Georgia (1992-1993), crossed the Russo-Chechen border
with a force of about 150 fighters and made his way to the city of
Buyonnovsk. After a skirmish with local Russian forces in the town
center, the fighters retreated to the city hospital where they held more
than 1,500 hostages for four days9. After unsuccessful raids by Russian
9This number includes patients and hospital personnel. There are conflicting reports
of the actual number with some suggesting close to 2000 hostages. The number reported
here is a generally accepted conservative estimate.
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anti-terrorist units and tense negotiations, Basayev and his men were
guaranteed safe passage back to Chechnya with 150 hostages to be
released upon their return. The event had a profound effect on how
the conflict was generally perceived: it illustrated that Chechen forces
were capable of incursions into Russia and that Russian forces were
ill-prepared to respond to unconventional threats. In turn, these led to
growing confidence among the Chechen forces and general population
and growing discontent among their Russian counterparts. Furthermore,
the event solidified Basayev’s reputation.
3.2.2 Inter-war period and onset of Second War
On April 23 of 1996, Chechen President Dudayev was killed by a
Russian missile strike after triangulating his position while he was
on a satellite phone; leadership passed on to then Chief of Staff
Aslan Maskhadov who himself narrowly escaped assassination only days
earlier. Yet these targeted attempts did little to change the accelerating
transformation of the conflict as Chechen groups were able to engage
in their unconventional tactics freely. Finally, on August 6 of 1996, the
Chechens launched a major offensive on Grozny and other urban areas
that swiftly led to the recapture of the capital. A Russian counter-offensive
over the next four days in the form of a siege was unsuccessful in retaking
the city. Protracted fighting amidst continued negotiations between
Maskhadov and Russian General Lebed resulted in the signing of the
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Khasavyurt Accord on August 30 bringing an end to the war in the form
of a ceasefire but no real settlement to the question of Chechnya’s status
in terms of sovereignty.
The inter-war period between 1996 and 1999 was marked by
social, political, and economic stagnation in Chechnya. The Maskhadov
administration was unsuccessful in establishing a viable political system
with functioning institutions. Thus, the promise of social and economic
welfare predicted by Dudayev at the outset did not come to fruition. At
the same time, the administration did not establish that fundamental
characteristic of statehood: the monopoly over the legitimate use of force
in its territory. Wartime groups did not relinquish control over their local
areas and the radicalization on the basis of Islamism accelerated and grew
in influence.
The Second Chechen War was initiated by the very same group that
helped bring the First one to an end; on August 7 of 1999, Basayev led an
incursion of about 500 of his fighters into Dagestan with the intention
of drawing the neighboring state into the conflict. The ultimate goal
was to create a pan-Caucasian Islamic state. The Russian response was
swift and within the month the incursion was repelled. Prime Minister
Putin, bolstered by the support of public opinion for a war that had taken
anti-terrorist overtones, took decisive action in escalating the conflict
within Chechnya with massive air strikes in urban areas. Replicating their
strategy from the First War, Chechen forces retreated to the mountainous
76
South and used similar unconventional tactics of ambushes and raids on
Russian forces with small, mobile units. At the same time, the increasing
use of terrorist tactics by various Chechen groups belied the shifting
ideological basis: suicide terrorism, kidnappings, executions, and an
emphasis on Islamist rhetoric.
Two hostage crises have had a profound effect on public perception
of the renewed conflict both within Russia and worldwide: the Dubrovka
Moscow theater crisis on October 23 of 2002, and the Beslan school
massacre on September 1 of 2004, for both of which Basayev ultimately
claimed responsibility. In the first case, a group of more than fifty
Chechen militants (including eighteen ‘black widows’, Chechen women
who participated in terrorist attacks including suicide attacks after
their husbands or sons were killed during the conflict) took about 850
hostages demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from
Chechnya. Russian special forces raided the building after releasing
a gas agent into the theater’s ventilation system killing most of the
hostage-takers as well as more than a hundred hostages. In the second
case, a rebel group held a school of more than a thousand children and
adults hostage in Beslan, a town in the neighboring republic of North
Ossetia. After a three-day siege, an (allegedly accidental) explosion inside
the school and a raid by the Russian special forces, between 300-400
hostages died either at the scene or at local hospitals that were woefully
unprepared for such an event.
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3.3 Discussion of conditions/measurements of
variables
3.3.1 Components of Chechen society
Chechens possess a strong sense of pride about the uniqueness and
obscurity of their social origins, a factor that when combined with their
geographical placement in a rugged mountainous area has created an
aura of both physical and psychological unapproachability. Chechens
refer to themselves as Nokhchi and to their closely related neighbors the
Ingush as Galgai (Chechnya and Ingushetia are both Russian derivatives of
place names); collectively, they are the Vainakh peoples and the territory
that they have traditionally occupied is referred to by the Turkic name of
Ichkeria. The native Chechen language is also quite unique: it is part of the
Nakh family of Northeast Caucasian languages (which only has two other
members, Ingush and Bats), exhibits very complex phonology, and bears
little resemblance to other languages, even to those that are classified
under other families of the Caucasian language tree.10
The history of Islam in Chechnya is no less unique; Chechens are
categorized under one of two Sufi sects, either the Naqshbandiya or the
Qadiriya. Sufism, as the mystical tradition of Islam, is differentiated even
10A fascinating detail is that very few words (less than 3,000) are classified as having true
Chechen origins. Most of the contemporary Chechen vocabulary is derived from a variety
of sources that exhibit the interactions of the Chechen people with various influences
over the years, mainly Russian, Turkic and Georgian - due to geographical proximity -
and, of course, Arabic as the liturgical language of Islam.
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further in the Chechen case by a long-term amalgamation of religion to
local customs to the extent that the resulting ethnoreligious character
is inseparable from both. As a result, the impact of religion on the
conflict has been much debated. Chechens were never religious in a
strict academic sense and Chechen customs deviated significantly from
Islamic law in many respects. This makes the influence of Wahhabism
and the resulting change in the basis of recruitment from nationalism to
religion between the First and Second Russo-Chechen Wars all the more
interesting.
Chechen society is characterized by some unique traits: an almost
total lack of social class stratification and an alternative clan-based social
structure composed of teips, a tradition of collective decision-making in
small territorially-based units with elder preeminence, and the evolution
of a multitude of adats, social customary laws that have traditionally taken
precedence over civil laws. Ultimately, the organization of the war effort as
a response to the Russian threat exhibited the importance of these features
in mounting a successful campaign; in fact, I argue that these preexisting
characteristics formed the conditions that favored Chechen success in the
conflict.
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3.4 Differences between the two wars
3.4.1 The role of social networks and norms in the First
War
Two basic stereotypes have been traditionally upheld in Chechen society:
that of the revered elder and that of the virile young warrior. Both
stereotypes (male in gender) have had an enduring effect on Chechen
social identity. Given the historical lack of class-based distinctions or other
hierarchical social orders throughout Chechen history, the loose hierarchy
provided by these stereotypes (which are intrinsically interwoven with
the traditions of adat discussed below) is all the more vital. Where the
two stereotypes coincided, they served to create powerful archetypes
that persevered in the Chechen psyche as models of heroism to be
replicated in times of need. The most prominent example of such an
archetype is that of the religious leader and military commander Imam
Shamil who waged war against the invading Russian forces from the
1830s until his surrender in 185911. Shamil was a religiously fanatic
despot who terrorized both opponents and dissenting allies. Alongside
his military achievements, which came against seemingly overwhelming
odds, Shamil also established a mythical reputation for escaping certain
death; twice he was cornered, injured and presumed dead (once in 1832
11For a comprehensive listing of resources on this historical episode, see Gammer
(2002).
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and then again in 1839) only to resurface shortly afterward. This ability
to withstand personal injury in a stoic manner has since been considered
as almost miraculous among those who regard themselves as his cultural
descendants.12
Lieven (1998, 118) provides two accounts that exemplify the dual
traditions of reverence for one’s elders and for the virility of warrior youths,
and the passage of those traditions from one generation to the next. Idris
Dokayev, the local group leader in the town of Alkhan Yurt, explained that
“even at fifteen, a boy here is expected to know how to handle weapons. In
most families, at that age the father will give his son a pistol, and will teach
him how to use it and how to look after it.” Ramzan Selmirzayev explained
that in his local group in the city of Vedeno “there are 20 of us, all relatives
or friends. Every group chooses its own commander, or elder. He doesn’t
order us to fight, he doesn’t need to. We all know why we are fighting, and
for what. We don’t have much contact with the high command. This isn’t
an army. It is the whole Chechen people who is fighting.” This account
further illustrates the lack of a strong hierarchical chain of command and
the autonomy of action exhibited by small units during the First War.
Most observers of Chechen society are amazed by the lack of
sociopolitical institutions to regulate interactions among Chechens.
12The infamous commander Shamil Basayev, is not only named after Imam Shamil but
has also exhibited the same uncanny ability to elude capture and “return from the dead”.
For example, Basayev was pronounced dead by the Russian Federal Security Service
(FSB) during fighting in Malachi, the capital of the Russian state of Kabardino-Balkaria,
in October 2005. The report was later retracted. He was killed in July 2006 amidst still
unclear circumstances.
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Throughout the existence of organized Chechen society, they have lacked
the most basic of regulatory institutions, including a police and judicial
system to enforce laws. In place of such institutions, there are numerous
social norms that are strictly adhered to. All such norms are known as
adats or customary laws and all are self-regulated within Chechen society.
As Smith (1998, 22) states, “it seems contradictory, but the anarchic love of
freedom coexists with strictly observed social laws.”
An interesting fact is that the adat system predates organized
religion in Chechnya. Many attempts to impose Sharia (Muslim) law
on the Chechens have failed since many of the provisions of Sharia
contradicted the pre-existing adats. For example, punishment in the
Sharia system is usually public. However, under the adat system,
punishment of individuals for defection from social norms is usually
conducted within the family or imposed by elders. Even though religion
tends to undermine the system, the adats have endured precisely because
of their enforcement mechanisms. Over time, however, alternative means
of organization around religious groups have developed in the form of
religious brotherhoods known as virds in the Sufi denomination. While
virds are not supposed to influence sociopolitical behavior and their
influence is nominally restricted to religious affairs, they tend to have an
ameliorative effect in assisting in the mediation of conflicts.
As already discussed above, historically there has been a lack of
hierarchical society in Chechnya. Instead, there is a social network where
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cells of membership intersect at various points starting with nuclear and
extended family ties to regionalism and religious subdivision. However,
no affiliation in the Chechen social network has been historically more
important than clan affiliation. Chechen clans are known as teips and
their origins are shrouded in myth and folklore. Teips, which number
at close to 160 are collected into nine major groupings (known as
tukhums). Each teip is further subdivided into gars which are groupings
of 10-15 households or whole small villages (Seely 2001). Teips originate
from common land ownership; therefore, they may be regarded as a
commons’ management mechanism. Thus, the teip’s affiliation with
land (a necessarily immobile asset) creates strong bonds among extended
families and even whole villages and reinforces the individual member’s
ties to the soil. Moreover, the teip’s identification with land facilitates
exclusivity and exclusion; it is impossible for an individual to be a member
of two teips at the same time. An individual can expect certain services
purely on the basis of membership; thus, a teip is not only a social network,
it is also a support network.
Perhaps, the most important distinction among teips is the
geographical divide between the North and the South of Chechnya along
the lines of mountain-teips and plains-teips. This division assumed an
organizational character during the First War since the mountainous
regions served as hideouts for rebel groups that fled the plains to
reorganize, rest and then redeploy down into the plains. Thus, while
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the battleground areas were concentrated in the North, the Southern
mountainous regions served as bases for the Chechen armed groups.
The historical traditions of what a Chechen male should represent
promote a martial culture where all males are considered potential fighters
in times of need; in fact, exhibiting attributes that conform to such
an image enhances one’s reputation within the social network. This
mechanism was conducive to recruitment during the First Russo-Chechen
War since it provided the information necessary for participant selection
in terms of fitness on a long-term basis. Moreover, the existence of a
strict code of conduct under the adat system aligned Chechen behavior
in conformity to a set of specific social norms that induced cooperation
and punished defection on a broad societal level. All these features served
to create a framework where the provision of selective benefits to potential
participants was largely unnecessary.
However, it should be noted that there has also been a recent
backlash to the idea that social networking - specifically using the teip
as the unit of analysis - was a determining characteristic of the way
in which conflict processes developed during the Russo-Chechen War.
Dettmering’s (2005) reassessment of the historical treatment of Chechen
clan structures in the 19th century suggests that a reliance only on clan
structure as an explanation for the organization of resistance can be
misleading. Other significant determinants such as the effect of terrain
on clan strength and their function as military units have been typically
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disregarded by many analysts. An assessment of the organization of
political violence in the First Russo-Chechen War exhibits both a similar
dynamic in terms of observation of real events but also in terms of
theoretical analysis. Many studies overemphasize the extent to which
the structure itself determined the organization and conduct of political
violence without paying proper attention to the interplay between terrain
and clan structure as well as their effect on military conduct.
Recent research on the role of clan allegiance seems to suggest that
Dettmering’s conclusions are reflected in the current social configuration
of Chechnya. Sokirianskaia’s (2005) survey of recent (2002-2005)
attitudes towards teip identification by Chechens presents an illuminating
distinction typically lost in the simplistic reliance on the historical
interpretation of clan structures. She finds that the role of the teip can
be seen either in its symbolic and traditional form of blood ties and tribal
entities, or in the colloquial sense of an extended family. She finds that
the latter interpretation is much more salient in contemporary Chechen
society, especially in terms of political-military groupings.
3.4.2 Organization of political violence in the First War
The military organization of Chechen resistance to the Russian invasion
of 1994 presents a balance between two different organizing principles: at
the top levels, the resistance resembled a ‘regular’ professional army, while
at the lower levels sub-units operated in a dispersed quasi-hierarchical
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manner, independently run by regional rebel leaders and engaging in
guerrilla warfare, mostly in an urban setting. At the outset of the First War,
there was little in the way of an organized army exhibiting the hierarchical
structure of a conventional armed force; no more than 1,000 were under
the command of Dudayev and Maskhadov in the form of a National Guard
at the time of the Russian attack (Baev, Koehler, and Zurcher, 2002, 60).
By comparison, the combined number of all irregular forces that resisted
the initial invasion of Grozny is estimated between 5,000 and 7,000 (Gall
and de Waal, 1998, 208). It is easy to see the decentralized nature of
the organization of political violence in the First War. Baev, Koehler,
and Zurcher (2002, 62) identify three major subdivisions of the Chechen
resistance: the organized groups led by specific field commanders (such
as Basayev) that participated full-time throughout the conflict, occasional
units that coordinated their actions with the organized groups at different
times, in which membership fluctuated depending on the perception
of threat, and independent units usually organized for the purposes of
defending individual villages. Out of the three types of Chechen VPOs,
only the first type were active at the beginning of the Second War.
The teip structure was instrumental in recruitment in both
Russo-Chechen wars, but especially the first one. Recruitment was
broadly organized around teip lines; regional rebel leaders would draw
from their own teip in order to create a group and then sustain it over time.
As Lieven (1998, 325) cautions though, it should be noted that the teip in
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itself is too loose an organizational structure in modern Chechnya to have
served as the only mechanism that facilitated recruitment. Since most
rebel groups were composed of volunteers, in most cases recruitment was
achieved through nuclear and extended family connections. On the one
hand, those must be considered as a subdivision of the teip (known as gar,
which typically consists of 10-15 families situated in territorial proximity)
which does not undermine the importance of the social network. On the
other hand, a stronger lens must be employed in looking at the micro-level
of recruitment. Arquilla and Karasik (1999, 209) agree that the formation
of social structures around the teip affiliation played a very important role
in the organization of the war effort in 199413. As other analysts tend to do,
they stress the especially important role of familial ties. They estimate that
each teip would aim at recruiting a force of about 600 fighters with four
units of 150 fighters each. Each unit would be subdivided into squads of
20; such squads would typically be composed either exclusively of family
members or a combination of relatives and close neighbors. With the
exception of larger units in urban areas, Chechen units were - as already
indicated - small, mobile and highly decentralized. Arquilla and Karasik
(1999, 210) note that “groups “commuted” from their homes to the field
of battle.” Units ranged in sizes of 12-20, typically organized around
extended families from individual villages.
13Arqulla and Karasik (1999) identify the Chechen organization of political violence as
an instance of “netwar” defined as “an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal
levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms
of organization” rather than military hierarchies (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 6).
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Sergey Kulikov, the commander of the Russian forces in Chechnya
following the capture of Grozny identifies the following as key factors in
the success of Chechen resistance: “close ties with the local populace,
actions by small detachments and teams, knowledge of and skillful use
of terrain” (2003, 22). The local populace provided the support network
necessary for the provision of food, clothing, shelter, medicine, and - if
necessary - reservists to replenish the ranks in case of personnel loss.
Perhaps most significantly for the coordination of political violence, the
support network was also effective as an information network whereby
communication among lateral units or between the semi-autonomous
resistance network and the structured National Guard was facilitated
without actual contact among them. The fluidity of participation in the
ranks of Chechen groups was not lost on the Russian military leadership;
Kulikov observes that groups would come together, disband, and change
roles rapidly and with little regularity. The one constant aspect of
this recurring recruitment process was that most fighters (especially
volunteers) would remain regionally-based and “fight only in areas from
which they [were] drawn.”
However, in addition to providing a pool of potential recruits, the
teip also served the significant function of providing information about
those recruits. In this way, the teip structure (and all its subdivisions)
served to minimize informational costs for the rebel group in terms of
fitness of each potential recruit. In the words of one Chechen leader,
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(quoted in Lieven (1998, 345)) “what matters is that someone has to be
recommended to us by people we know and respect. They may be our
relatives, or they may be connected to us in some other way. We have
our traditions and they are very strong.” Arquilla and Karasik (1999, 210)
report that “commuting [as a squad from their homes to the battlefield]
also ensured that all those whom a fighter knew would be kept well aware
of his conduct on the battlefield - a significant impetus to acts of bravery.”
Conversely, signs of cowardice in combat would lead to loss of reputation
within the gar, and by extension, in the teip as a whole.
While the above should illustrate the significance of Chechnya’s
social structure in understanding the recruitment patterns employed at
the beginning of the conflict, one must not overstate that argument and in
so doing neglect the impact of the hierarchical structure of the resistance
at its upper strata. That the Chechen war effort was organized in the
fashion of a professional army at its upper echelons should be no surprise.
The leaders (as well as many among the standing army regulars) had all
served at high ranking positions in the Soviet Army. Dzokhar Dudayev
had reached the rank of Major General in the Soviet Air Force and at
the pinnacle of his career had been the commander of the nuclear air
force base in Tartu, Estonia. Aslan Maskhadov, his second-in-command
and eventual replacement as president of the breakaway state, reached
the rank of Colonel in charge of Soviet artillery in Vilnius, Lithuania
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before retiring in 1992.14 Both put their skills to great use as leaders
of the resistance. Kulikov (2003, 21) notes that the Russians were
surprised to find in 1994 “Chechnya’s well-organized, standing armed
forces equipped with weapons and hardware from virtually all branches
of arms.” These arms were acquired either by ransacking the stockpiles
of the former Soviet warehouses in the area15, by ambushes and raids
on Russian troops, by bartering with Russian troops in exchange for
cigarettes, drugs and alcohol, or by importing them from various countries
(predominantly Islamic) partial to the Chechen cause. Further than the
technical know-how and availability of weapons, the Chechen resistance
also adhered to the structure of military units. Each contingent was
composed of: a field commander and staff deputies who usually had
served as officers in the Soviet Army in various capacities, a team whose
sole purpose was to protect the field commander, a reconnaissance
team (usually augmented through the use of local civilians as scouts to
provide information on Russian troop movements), signalmen, snipers,
riflemen and special forces (Kulikov 2003, 21). These units (unlike the
regionally-based guerrilla groups) were deployed at all times. Rather than
commute from their homes to the battlefield (a tactic which requires little
14The fact that both Chechen leaders had been posted in the Baltic states just as
those states were calling for independence from the Soviet Union is not of merely
circumstantial interest; both were greatly influenced by the events that they witnessed
firsthand and, upon returning to their native land, already had an example to follow.
15At one time, Chechnya had been proposed as the site for nuclear missile storage.
During the conflict, Dudayev – at numerous times – threatened with the use of nuclear
weapons on Russian citizens. Whether the threat was credible was never ascertained.
90
prior organization) they would retreat to the mountains to regroup and
then attack down into the plains, a technique that Chechens had used
against Russian incursions for three centuries.
Thus, even though an assessment of organization along teip lines
is possible (since kinship ties would tend to coincide with teip ties), it is
somewhat misleading to consider the teip as a unit of analysis at least in
terms of the construction of individual military units. If that were the case,
we would expect to find units much larger than those that were active in
the First War. Moreover, the use of terrain in operational tactics and the
networking effect of diffuse, localized organization with a high degree of
familiarity within and among units were equally important factors.
3.4.3 Failure in post-conflict reconstruction
The interwar period between 1996 and 1999 can only be characterized as
a massive failure for Chechnya. The toll of the First War was staggering:
the estimated loss of human life was 36,000 civilians, 4,000 Chechen
combatants and 7.500 Russian troops (Lanskoy 2003, 186). Not even
a semblance of public administration and provision of services existed.
Faced with this predicament, Maskhadov faced an even more pressing
problem; groups of fighters that had coalesced around specific leaders had
effectively become private armies. Their allegiance was to their leader and
not to their state.
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Blandy (2003, 430) identifies the following factions in the
fragmented political environment that developed in Chechnya in the
inter-war period: support for the President Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev
and his progressing alignment with the external Wahhabi elements, and
several other smaller factions centered around a person that commanded
small bands of loyalists such as Udugov, Yandarbiyev and (eventual
President of the pro-Russian form of the Chechen Republic) Kadyrov.
Lanskoy combines the element of criminality with the issue of the
allegiances of different armed groups. For example, she claims that Arbi
Baraev’s Islamic Special Forces Division (IPON) was “responsible for most
of the hostage trade and the murders of foreign aid workers”. This example
also highlights the interconnections in this chaotic, fragmented space,
as Baraev was also connected to the Wahhabi faction. In other words,
there was no way to characterize these organizations through neat and
distinct categories, neither in terms of their objectives nor in terms of
their alliances. On the other hand, it was clear that by 1999, the unifying
elements that had facilitated the organization of political violence in
Chechnya into a cohesive - if diffuse - entity had evaporated.
Tishkov (2001, 13) identifies the legacy of the first war and the
primary failure of post-conflict reconstruction in Chechnya as “a problem
of conflict generating doctrinal legacies and of fighting arguments in favor
of ongoing violence.” Thus, for some political actors facing the prospect
of long-term peace was less favorable to the continuation of hostilities.
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These conditions allowed for the ascendancy of forces that changed the
perspective of the conflict for the participants as well as for external
observers. At the same time, the dynamics that governed the organization
of political violence and where to shape the form that the conflict would
take in the years to come were also fundamentally transformed.
3.4.4 The rise of radical Islam and Wahhabism
The influence of Wahhabism in Chechnya (and the Caucasus region more
broadly (Gammer 2005; Walker 2005) and the resulting radicalization
of the conflict have received ample attention in the literature. This
development has had a profound effect on changing perceptions of the
conflict by external observers, especially in the West (Derluguian 1999;
Lieven 1999). During the First War, global public opinion had been largely
on the side of the Chechen plight; even Russian commentators on the
War were critical of the tactics employed by the Russian forces and the
resulting humanitarian disaster in the region (Politkovskaya 1999; 2003).
Yet as the tactics employed by Chechen armed groups resorted to tactics of
terrorism, the tide of public opinion turned (de Waal, 2003). This allowed
the Russian political leadership to place Chechnya within the framework
of the War on Terror (Williams 2004). Ultimately, the trajectory that led
to this transformation of the conflict can be traced back to the Wahhabi
factor.
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Derluguian (1999), in his seminal account of the rise of Islamism
in Chechnya, pinpoints 1995 as the year that served as the turning
point of the conflict. In the beginning, a heightened Islamic awareness
among Chechens served the purposes of Chechen leaders. It further
differentiated between Chechens and Russians, even if only in symbolic
significance since religion had almost nothing to do with the conflict.
Once the wheels of Islamization were set in motion, it proved impossible
for Dudayev and later Maskhadov to dampen the gathering momentum.
During the inter-war period, the continued appeal of the move towards
Islamization began to backfire; Maskhadov found himself unable to
stop the move towards Sharia law and was forced the accommodate
the extremist elements within his administration. Ultimately, this
development led to a growing rift within Chechnya between the traditional
Sufi order and the emergent Wahhabi influence (Derluguian 2003, 5). The
radicalization process was starting to become a self-fulfilling prophecy
that silenced moderate voices in Chechnya. However, it is also important
to note that the Islamic dimension did not suddenly come to the forefront
in 1999 but had been growing in significance over time. Wilhelmsen (2005,
37) notes that the process of radicalization for warlords such as Basayev,
Raduyev, Udugov, Yandarbiyev, and Baraev began well before the Second
War.
Walker (2005) breaks down the process of radicalization into distinct
changes and corresponding patterns of pronouncements by leaders as
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well as recruitment patterns. Prior and leading up to the First War
the conflict against the Russian state was expressed strictly in terms
of competing nationalisms; he notes that this was “little different
from ethno-national mobilization in other parts of the Soviet Union
at the time.” (2005, 257) Militants who primarily relied on religious
pronouncements were largely marginalized and Islam was considered but
one part of Chechen identity rather than a driving force for the ensuing
conflict. Over the course of the First War, however, Islamism became an
increasingly salient factor more commonly used by some militant leaders.
By the end of the First War, Walker argues that Chechnya had undergone
a change which he calls Islamo-nationalism, a potent blend of religion
and nationalism that is evident in the changing pronouncements and
behavior of virtually all Chechen leaders, including the new President
and hero of the First War Aslan Maskhadov. A simultaneously developing
trend was the rise of a different philosophy which Walker terms
Islamo-internationalism, whose proponents characterize as the struggle
against Russia not as a contest between competing ethnicities but as
“a defense of Islam and the liberation of a Muslim land from foreign
occupation.” Thus, the struggle is reinterpreted as another part in a
composite struggle for the defense of all Muslims at the global or at least
the regional (see Williams 2003) level .
All these components - Islamism as a growing force, the
radicalization of Chechen leaders, and the placement of the Chechen
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conflict in a global jihadist framework - created the conditions for the
rising influence of Wahhabis in the conflict. Wahhabism was of marginal
influence in Chechnya at the beginning of the conflict. According to
Lanskoy (2002, 168) the label ‘Wahhabite’ in Chechnya had little to do
with religious or social dissent, but instead connoted criminality; it served
more as a description of behavior and perception rather than a description
of religious sect. In the resource-starved Chechnya of 1996, Wahhabis
with external funding and manpower were a very attractive ally for the
Chechen warlords. Moreover, an alliance with Wahhabis meant an indirect
alliance with their connections in the Islamic world at large; thus, an
Islamic Chechen state would lead to long-term relationships with a system
of which the traditionally isolated Chechnya had not been a part.
3.4.5 Organization of political violence in the Second War
A cursory analysis of the organization of political violence in the Second
War seems to suggest a totally different scenario from the First War: the
stated objectives were different, and there were changes in both overall
strategy and specific tactics. Yet, the trajectory of the Second War can
be viewed as an extension of the First War and the resulting inter-war
period both in general terms and with respect to the specific issues of
recruitment, the organization, and the conduct of political violence.
The goals of warfare in the Second War shifted from an emphasis
on national identity, protection of the homeland, and resistance to the
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Russian invasion to an emphasis on religious identity, the establishment
of an Islamic state of the Caucasus, and taking the fight to Russian soil.
Unlike the First War, these objectives were not universally shared by all
Chechens. Thus, the basis of eligibility for recruitment changed from
necessary applicability to personal ideological beliefs. This in itself seems
to change the parameters of the collective action problem, while reducing
the utility of the social network as an enforcement mechanism. But the
prior occurrence of conflict effectively obviates the need for mechanisms
that reveal information about potential participants since the majority of
those who would contribute in the immediate future had already done so
in the recent past. At the same time, the involvement of external actors
who self-selected themselves into the conflict, and the cause for global
jihad provided both manpower and resources in ways that helped alleviate
all the associated problems with recruiting active participants.
Furthermore, the characterization of a continual conflict rather
than two distinct ones can be seen in simpler terms in the objectives
of the primary actors. For many of those who rose to prominence
in the organization of political violence in the Second War, there had
been no real end to the war since the objectives of the First War were
never met to begin with. As Williams (2003, 15) observes, undertones
of jihad were evident from the beginning of the First War, even though
the ethnonationalist dimension came to define the conflict both in the
eyes of the participants and external observers. Tanrisever (2000,84) adds
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that “the war created generations of fighters and total unemployment that
nourished instability”. Thus, the availability of engaged fighters with no
alternative incentives to demobilize sustained an existing level of latent
participation which was triggered into action with minimal requirements
for organization.
The infamous Khattab arrived in Chechnya and joined Basayev’s
forces in 1995. By 1996, the mujaheddin had begun training Chechen units
(Bodansky 2007, 152; Murphy 2004, 39). Foreign mujaheddin were arriving
from other areas where they fought for global jihad: Afghanistan, Pakistan,
the Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Along with them came resources that
were growing increasingly scarce; after all, the First War was conducted
mainly with weaponry of the Soviet legacy. Hughes (2007, 98) identifies
a variety of factors that led to increasing radicalization in the inter-war
period: the traumatizing experience of the war, a general turn towards
religiosity (but not necessarily radicalism) throughout the Caucasus in the
post-Soviet era, and the inability of the Chechen elite - most prominently
Maskhadov - to establish and then sustain robust political institutions.
Ultimately, however, the Wahhabi factor was the most significant one in
radicalizing elements of the Chechen forces that were unsatisfied with the
outcome of the conflict. Over time, the local conflict was subsumed in a
regional interpretation of an Islamic struggle against the Russians, which
in turn was depicted as part of a global jihad.
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The current situation that has taken characteristics of civil war
between pro-Russian factions such as the supporters of the Kadyrov
regime and Umarov’s self-proclaimed Caucasus Emirate that is supported
by the Arab mujaheddin can be seen as a direct outgrowth of these
developments with the consequence of an ongoing conflict with little
likelihood of resolving the initial issue of Chechen independence and
self-determination.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter applies a theoretical framework of recruitment by
organizations of political violence. The framework focuses on the
role of social networks and social norms as an alternative to the provision
of selective benefits in resolving collective action problems. The First and
Second Russo-Chechen Wars serve as an illustrative case study of the
theoretical mechanisms underlying the framework especially in the area
of the usage of social norms. At the same time, the application frames
the evolution of the organization of political violence from the First to the
Second War. Two areas of further research suggest themselves. The first is
an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the organization and the
conduct of political violence that would provide a better understanding
of the dynamics of the conflict. The second is a strategic analysis of the
organization and conduct of political violence on both sides that extends
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beyond recruitment as a dependent variable towards a deterministic
model of political violence.
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Chapter 4
Case Study: Sierra Leone
4.1 Introduction
The civil war in Sierra Leone has gathered considerable attention since
its start in the early 1990s for a variety of reasons. It is now de rigeur to
begin an analysis of the conflict with a discussion of the effect that Robert
D. Kaplan’s (1994) thesis of a dystopian post-Cold War scenario had on
perceptions of the conflict, especially in the West. Amidst a multitude
of theses (Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1992; 1996; Mearsheimer 1990;
Mueller 1989) put forward at the end of the Cold War about the prospects
for peace in an uncertain international system, Kaplan’s presented the
bleakest scenario. Sierra Leone was set as the exemplar of Kaplan’s
cautionary discourse of the future potential for societal breakdown that,
reportedly, had a profound effect among Washington policymakers at the
time. In hindsight, was Kaplan right? Can the Sierra Leonean civil war be
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characterized as a case of the confluence of tyranny, thuggery, tribalism,
and disease? Some aspects of his neo-Malthusian tinged argument are
definitely valid; both tyranny and thuggery were significant factors, not
only in Sierra Leone but also in other regional conflicts1. Yet such a static
interpretation of the conflict fails to account for the dynamic complexities
that are examined below.
Other accounts of the causes of war in the case of Sierra Leone focus
on alternative explanations. One common explanation is the concept of
state collapse (Allen 1999; Baker 1999; Doornbos 2002; Reno 1999). Reno’s
framework of warlordism filling the vacuum of failed state institutions has
been particularly influential2,3. Another is the war in Sierra Leone as a
spillover from the war in neighboring (and meddling) Liberia (Gershoni
1997). Yet, by far and away, the most common interpretation of the conflict
has centered on the role of lootable, natural resources as a cause of war;
the literature in this area has been voluminous (see, inter alia, Gilmore
2005; Grant 2005; Le Billon 2001; Ross 2004a; 2004b; Snyder 2004; Snyder
and Bhavnani 2005; Tamm 2002) .
The organization of political violence - and, more specifically,
recruitment - have not received nearly as close attention in the literature.
Perhaps expectedly, the characteristic of the conflict that has received the
1For an assessment of the causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone that uses Kaplan’s
argument as a starting point, see Riley and Sesay (1995).
2Reno (1999) is cited by just about every account of the conflict; the other framework
to enjoy this distinction is that of Richards (1996).
3For an account that moves away from the ‘state collapse’ model, see Raeymaekers
(2005).
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most attention in this respect has been the use of children as combatants
(Abdullah and Rashid 2004; Ashby 2002; Beah 20074; Zack-Williams
2001). Due to the obvious ethical repercussions of this phenomenon,
much of this literature has focused on human rights’ violations (Amnesty
International 2000a; 2000b; Human Rights Watch 2005; International
Labour Office 2003; Smith, Gambette and Longley 2004) and the process
of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) as part of the
post-conflict reconstruction of the Sierra Leonean society (Bretherton,
Weston and Zbar 2003; Peters 2007; Sommers 2002; 2003). The issue
of juvenile combatants is nonetheless relevant both to the organization
and the conduct of the conflict. Not only were children recruited by the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) but also by the Sierra Leonean Army
(SLA), the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and the West Side Boys (WSB).
There are some accounts of the social dynamic that led to the
formation of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone but there
has been considerable disagreement among them. The most prominent
debate within the literature revolves around Paul Richards’ (1996) Fighting
for the rain forest: War, resources and youth in Sierra Leone5. The
book was the first serious treatment of the conflict starting with the
inception of the RUF. Part of the rationale for the book was the attempt
to respond to Kaplan’s interpretation of the conflict; Richards argued
4Beah’s is not an academic account of the conflict but a detailed first-person account
of a child combatant; in this case, one that was recruited by the Sierra Leonean Army.
5For an account of the development of this scholarly debate, see the Preface to Gberie
(2005).
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that neither deforestation nor overpopulation could be considered as
significant contributing factors. Quite to the contrary, Richards argued,
the war could only be understood as an extension of the traditional
relationship between the Sierra Leoneans and the rain forest. As such,
behavior during the conflict could be characterized as fulfilling traditional
‘performance’ roles. While this ritualistic anthropological interpretation
of the conflict had significant influence on Western scholarship on the
conflict6, it was heavily criticized by Sierra Leonean scholars. Several
responses antithetical to Richards’ thesis were put forward, all of which
are reviewed in this chapter7.
This chapter presents this debate in order to examine the organizing
principles of the conflict of the RUF, the recruitment strategies that the
organization used as well as its conduct during the conflict. At the same
time, the RUF is juxtaposed to the CDF in order to highlight significant
differences in patterns of recruitment, even in the face of apparent
similarity. The analysis of the RUF serves as an example of a case study
where the organization’s deviation from the optimal strategy suggested
by the framework constrained its future options. On the other hand, the
6Just about every article written on Sierra Leone cites Richards (1996); increasingly,
citations of that work have been more critical as dissenting interpretations of the conflict
have developed. For a period of time, however, many accounts relied on the book as the
definitive explanation of the causes of the conflict; for examples, see Boas (2001; 2002)
and Simons (1999).
7The debate among Sierra Leonean scholars that was sparked by Richards’
book was carried out on the on-line Sierra Leonean listserv Leonenet
(http://www.leonenet.net/). The listserv’s archives are hosted by Texas A&M University
(http://listserv.tamu.edu/archives/leonenet.html).
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CDF which arose in opposition exhibited the very characteristics that are
central to the framework that I present: usage of existing social networks
and norms in optimizing recruitment.
4.2 Historical overview of the conflict
The civil war in Sierra Leone began when the Revolutionary United Front
of Sierra Leone passed the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone on March
23 of 1991. Two small forces, no more than 150 fighters in total, entered
Sierra Leone at two different entry points: Bomaru in the Kailahun District
of the Eastern Province, and over the Mano River Bridge in the Pujehun
District of the Southern Province. Under the leadership of Foday Saybana
Sankoh, the RUF quickly moved through border towns and surrounding
villages. Within a few months they assumed control over much of
southern and eastern Sierra Leone along the border with Liberia, including
the diamond mining region of the Kono District. Initially composed of
Sierra Leonean dissidents, some members of the National Patriotic Front
of Liberia (NPFL), and Burkinabe mercenaries, the group established
control through a series of attacks over the porous border between the
two war-torn states. NPFL members were identifiable to Sierra Leoneans
through their foreign accent and use of Liberian dialects. The RUF grew
in size exponentially as recruitment - increasingly forcible - and training
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of fighters (including children) started immediately in camps that were
hastily established in Kailahun.
Throughout 1991, the RUF exhibited the ruthless tactics that would
draw so much international attention in the years to come: the abduction
of civilians, forced labor, sexual violence, burning of residences or even
whole villages, and systematic targeting of authority of any kind including
state officials and traditional leaders such as tribal elders. The RUF’s
incursions had a profound effect on regime change in Sierra Leone.
The All People’s Congress (APC) had been in power since the late 1960s
in Sierra Leone under the leadership of Siaka Stevens. With Stevens’
hand-picked successor Joseph Momoh in power, the APC appeared
increasingly unable to mount a counter-insurgency campaign and stifle
the rebel movement. Mired in corruption and possessing an inefficient
and ill-equipped standing army of about 3,000 soldiers8, the APC regime
appeared to languish in popular support, especially among the population
of Mende9 ethnicity that was primarily concentrated in the areas most
affected by the conflict. In April 1992, this provided the impetus for a
coup led by a group of disgruntled army officers known as the National
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) under the - allegedly reluctant, see
Hirsch (2001, 35) - leadership of 25-year old Captain Valentine Strasser.
This development was deemed positive by many Sierra Leoneans; the
8This figure includes reservists as reported in Keen (2005, 83).
9The Mende and the Temne are the largest ethno-linguistic subdivisions of Sierra
Leone at about one-third of the population each. They are respectively geographically
concentrated in the South and North of Sierra Leone.
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NPRC presented the possibility of a fresh start with a clean slate and the
hope of a move away from corruption and patrimonialism.
As a response to the momentum gained by the RUF, and as a
strategy aimed at minimizing the RUF’s pool of potential recruits, the
NPRC launched a sweeping recruitment initiative employing techniques
similar to those used by the RUF, mainly targeting young males. With the
tremendous upswell in army ranks - up to 12,000 as reported by Richards
(1996) - a remarkable phenomenon developed: young soldiers who acted
as rebels by night, engaging in looting and terror tactics. They became
known as ‘sobels’. The phenomenon had a profound effect on public
opinion among Sierra Leoneans with the increasing perception that the
majority of violent behavior was being perpetrated by members of the
army. Subsequently, the perception of the NPRC as a clean break from
past corrupt practices started to diminish (Keen 1995).
At the same time, a civil militia group comprised of local hunters
called the Donsos joined the SLA in the Kono District, fighting side by
side with forces of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in
Liberia (ULIMO), opponents of the NPFL in Liberia. The Donsos, together
with other local hunting societies throughout Sierra Leone such as the
Tamaboros and the Kamajors, would later join forces and form the Civil
Defence Forces, an increasingly important organization in the changing
dynamics of the conflict. Over time and as the behavior of ‘sobels’ (little
differentiable from that of the rebels) caused increasing tension between
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the SLA and civil militia groups, civilian mistrust of the SLA became
widespread.
The RUF, which had become less visible over the course of the past
year renewed its campaign around the Christmas period of 1994. A series
of separate attacks and hostage-taking incidents at different parts of the
country, beginning in December of 1994 and continuing into early 1995,
brought the RUF back to prominence. Throughout March, April and May
of that year, RUF forces concentrated their efforts on consolidating control
over many towns in the western, diamond-rich area of the Kono District.
As the conflict between the RUF and the NPRC regime intensified,
the latter recruited Nigerian conscripts and Nepalese Gurkha mercenaries
as complements to the national armed forces. This knee-jerk reaction
was largely unsuccessful as the Gurkhas suffered severe losses and were
summarily withdrawn following the death of their leader US Colonel
Robert Mackenzie in February of 1995. The reliance of the NPRC on
external actors in opposition to the RUF did not end there, as the Gurkhas
were soon replaced by a South African security firm known as Executive
Outcomes (EO)10 in May of 1995. This was not the start of Executive
Outcomes’ involvement in the conflict as NPRC soldiers had been sent
to South Africa to train with the organization as early as December 1993
(Keen 2005, 100). The outcome was immediate: the Special Task Force
10For the use of mercenaries in Sierra Leone in general, see Francis (1999). For an
account of the involvement of Executive Outcomes in African conflicts including but not
limited to Sierra Leone, see Harding (1997) and Howe (1998).
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(STF), comprised of Executive Outcomes, SLA and ULIMO members was
successful in contesting control of territory and wresting large diamond
mining areas from the hands of the RUF.
On January 16 of 1996 Strasser was replaced by Brigadier General
Julius Maada Bio in a bloodless internal coup. Strasser was handcuffed
and flown to Conakry, the capital of neighboring Guinea. Bio’s reign
was short-lived as the presidential and legislative elections in late
February went ahead as planned despite allegations and some evidence of
disruptive attempts by Bio’s regime (Hirsch 2001; Keen 2005). On March
17 of 1996, after a required run-off election in which he defeated the
leader of the United National People’s Party (UNPP) John Karefa Smart,
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was elected
president of Sierra Leone.
Kabbah’s most pressing priority upon assumption of the presidency
was to put an end to the conflict as soon as possible. Constant negotiations
between the government and the RUF started taking place in April and
eventually came to fruition in November of 1996; undoubtedly, RUF’s
mounting losses to both Executive Outcomes and the Kamajors hastened
the hand of the rebels. Yet the Abidjan Peace Agreement, signed on
November 30 and scheduled to be formally implemented on December
19 with the launch of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
(a joint governmental-RUF commission), broke down just as soon as
the proverbial ink dried. Amidst allegations of improprieties on both
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sides, some alleged and some confirmed, communication between the
government and the rebels broke down by January 1997.
In the aftermath of the failure of the peace process, events unfolded
in rapid succession in Sierra Leone. Sankoh was arrested in early March of
1997 during a trip to Nigeria and would eventually be held in custody there
until July of 1998 when he would be flown back to Freetown to stand trial.
Soon after his capture, a cadre of RUF elites unsuccessfully attempted
to oust him in an internal coup. A group of junior army officers calling
themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) seized the
opportunity created by the instability within the RUF and the breakdown
of the peace process and with swift military action on May 25 of 1998
took control of Freetown in that single day. The AFRC freed all political
prisoners including their leader, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who had
been imprisoned since an earlier coup attempt in September 199611.
In an astonishing move, the AFRC - erstwhile combatants against
the RUF as army officers under the previous regime - immediately
extended an olive branch to their former enemies. Collaboration between
the two organizations, including direct communication between Sankoh
and Koroma began as soon as the AFRC assumed the reins in Freetown.
The task of opposition fell to civil defense groups and international forces.
International support came in the form of the Economic Community
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) established by the
11Koroma claimed that he “knew nothing about” the coup for which he was imprisoned
as reported in Keen (2005, 208) as part of the author’s interview of Koroma.
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and mainly
consisted of Nigerian forces. Ultimately, it was these forces that managed -
after brutal urban warfare - to oust the AFRC/RUF coalition from Freetown
in mid-February of 1998. On March 10, President Kabbah returned to the
capital in an atmosphere of hope that the expulsion of the junta regime
would signify the end of the conflict. Far from it, by the end of the year the
RUF was poised for renewed attacks on Freetown. In early January 1999,
they did just that in a devastating attack on the city, attacking civilians
indiscriminately and freeing imprisoned rebels. Ultimately, though, they
were driven back by ECOMOG forces after a three day (January 6-9) battle.
However, Olonikasin (2004, 230) reports that the cost of repelling the rebel
attack “was colossal; 5,000 civilians were killed and millions of property
damaged.”
After strong international pressure, discussions between the RUF
and the Kabbah administration resulted in a ceasefire on May 24 of 1999.
The dialogue culminated in the Lome Peace Agreement signed on July 7,
1999 which replicated much of the earlier Abidjan Agreement. Internal
fragmentation within the RUF had been growing since the retreat from
Freetown. With Sankoh publicly advocating the end of hostilities while
the RUF pushed on, it was clear by the end of the year that the provisions
of the agreement would be difficult to enforce.
On October 22 of 1999, the United Nations Security Council
authorized the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to
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Sierra Leone, in order to assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace
Agreement. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was
deployed in late 1999. By January of 2000, 4,500 UNAMSIL troops were
present in Sierra Leone with the provision to expand over time as they took
on the responsibilities of ECOMOG. The DDR program was launched at
the same time, even as hostilities between the RUF and the CDF resumed.
ECOMOG’s withdrawal in May of 2000 opened the window of
opportunity for RUF forces to launch attacks against UNAMSIL leading
to the hostage-taking of around 500 UN peacekeepers. The UK (a
significant source of international influence throughout the conflict) sent
a contingent to Freetown with the aim of providing security for the area
around the capital but most importantly to train government forces. When
eleven of these UK troops were taken hostage by the West Side Boys12, the
UK response (called Operation Barras13) was decisive. The hostages were
rescued in September of 2000, but more importantly rebel presence in the
capital was effectively eliminated as the West Side Boys were decimated by
the British forces.
As the remnants of the RUF hierarchy disintegrated, hostilities
became increasingly sporadic and uncoordinated and in August of 2000,
RUF forces surrendered to UN peacekeepers in Kabala. Renegotiation
of a ceasefire took place in Abuja, Nigeria; the agreement was signed on
12The West Side Boys were a particularly violent splinter group of the AFRC/RUF
coalition concentrated in the poor Eastern districts of Freetown.
13For an analysis of Operation Barras, see Fowler (2005).
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November 10 of 2000 and renewed on May 4 of 2001. On January 18 of
2002, during a symbolic ceremony President Kabbah declared the official
end of the disarmament period and the war. Later that year, Kabbah was
elected to his second - and final as constitutionally mandated - term as
President. In 2007, the SLPP lost the election to the APC whose leader
Ernest Bai Koroma ascended to the presidency.
At the same time, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established
in order to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and general
violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict. The
Court was the result of a request by President Kabbah to the United
Nations for assistance. Since 2003, the Court has indicted thirteen
participants to the conflict. Five leaders of the RUF were put on trial:
Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie both died in custody while awaiting trial;
Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao received sentences of 52,
40, and 25 years in prison, respectively. Four leaders of the AFRC were
indicted; three of them, Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and
Santigie Borbor Kanu were convicted, the first two to 50 years in prison,
the latter to 45. The AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma fled Sierra Leone
in December of 1993 and his whereabouts were never established again;
he is officially considered to have been killed, a claim that has never been
fully confirmed.
The most controversial cases for the Special Court have been the
ones that involved leaders of the CDF. Samuel Hinga Norman, former
113
Minister of the Interior and overall leader of the CDF, as well as Allieu
Kondewa and Moinina Fofana, military commanders of the Kamajors,
were indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since the
CDF’s role was generally seen as positive in the conflict and on the side
of forces that aimed to restore democratic government in Freetown, the
indictments were regarded differently than those of the rebel and junta
leaders. Yet the conduct of the CDF during the conflict was in many ways
similar to that of the RUF. Norman died under custody, while Kondewa
received a sentence of 20 years and Fofana a sentence of 15.
Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia and leader of the
NPFL who was so instrumental to the RUF’s rise at the beginning, was
the sole non-Sierra Leonean indicted for his role in the conflict. His trial
started on June 4 of 2007, and it is currently still ongoing.
4.3 The Organization of political violence in the
Sierra Leonean civil war
4.3.1 Establishment of the RUF
How did an organization with the stated aim of fighting state corruption
come to terrorize the very people on whose behalf it purported to operate?
In other words, how did it come to replicate the very behavior to which
it aimed to put an end? To answer these questions, it is necessary to
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examine the composition of the RUF at its inception: Which principles
helped develop the organizational basis of the RUF? How did its leadership
come together and how did those leaders aim to pursue their goals for
political change in Sierra Leone? At the same time, it is important to
consider the degree to which the events that ensued were truly in pursuit
of some specific ideological pronouncements or simply an exercise in
resource appropriation. Ultimately, it is necessary to consider the
collective ideology espoused by those who acted at the group’s inception
as well as their personal motivations and the way the combination of the
two shaped the behavior exhibited by the RUF throughout the conflict.
More importantly, at least for the purposes of this study, the following
question must be answered: Why would an organization with the stated
aim of liberating a population which represented its pool of potential
participants systematically attack them throughout the conflict? Such
behavior is undoubtedly counterproductive; it serves to minimize rather
than maximize recruitment. Thus, in addition to the organizing principles
that came to define the core leadership of the RUF, it is important
to examine the way in which it came to rely on coercive recruiting
mechanisms.
As already stated, the first wave of scholarly attention to the Sierra
Leonean civil war produced a vigorous debate between Paul Richards,
the scholar whose 1996 account of the conflict first set the parameters
for analyzing the conflict, and a group of Sierra Leonean scholars who
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interpreted Richards’ framework as misguided and misapplied to the case
of Sierra Leone. While that debate was intended to explain the causes of
the conflict, it certainly bears interest in an analysis of the foundations of
the RUF, the composition of its leadership at the initial stage, and the way
in which it developed during the course of the conflict. By extension, that
analysis can serve to explain the conduct of the RUF and its interactions
with the ever-changing political administration of Sierra Leone (in an
iteration of which the RUF actively participated), as well as the CDF that
emerged in direct opposition to the RUF.
In the final analysis, the two sides of the debate agree on the
ideological foundations of the movement: an amalgamation of Socialism
and Pan-Africanism combined with the ideas of Muammar Qaddafi in
the Green Book and Kim il-Sung’s Juche Idea14. Where the two sides
disagree is on the role of the eventual RUF leaders in this intellectual
movement that was taking place in Sierra Leone in the 1970s15. Richards
explains the RUF’s core as a social movement led by an elite cadre of
excluded intellectuals who coalesced around a set of ideological principles
and over a period of time developed into a cohesive network; in other
words, precisely the student radicals that Rashid describes. As a result, he
14It is interesting to note that these clusters of ideas are essentially contradictory.
Socialism and Pan-Africanism are both expansionist political philosophies with an
emphasis on international and regional unification, respectively. On the other hand, both
Qaddafi’s and Kim il-sung’s philosophies are essentially isolationist with an emphasis on
national self-sufficiency, even though both philosophies were intended for application
beyond Libya and North Korea.
15Specifically, among the students of the country’s leading academic institution Fourah
Bay College, according to Rashid (2004, 69)
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interprets the Sierra Leonean war as the culminating crisis after prolonged
periods of decline of the existing patrimonial state16. Conversely, Abdullah
and Muana (1998) identify the RUF’s origins in the lumpenproletariat
underclass of rebellious youth that proliferated in Freetown in the 1970s
and that social group’s loose association with radical students on the basis
of the common experience of repression under the Siaka Stevens regime.
Yet, where Richards sees a well-rounded and articulated ideological basis,
others see a hodge-podge of revolutionary pronouncements with the
goal of providing enough of a focal point for the organization of these
underclass elements; in other words, the eventual leaders of the RUF were
among those who co-opted these radical philosophies but they were never
the intellectual authors of the movement.
Analyses of this formative social structure of the RUF (Abdullah
2004; Abdullah and Muana 1998; Bangura 2004; Gberie 2005; Rashid 2004)
see the evolution of the relationship between student radicalism and the
lumpen under-class as pivotal to the inception of the organization and
informative as to the behavior that it later exhibited. Abdullah (1998, 207)
defines lumpens as “the largely unemployed and unemployable youths,
mostly male, who live by their wits or who have one foot in what is
generally referred to as the informal or underground economy. They are
16Patrimonialism is used in the Weberian sense of a system of government that rules
by using a patron-client relationship in its use of administrative and military resources. It
is, by definition, an exclusionary system where there is little division between the public
and private spheres, and where opportunities for liberalization of political institutions
are actively limited by the patron.
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prone to criminal behavior, petty theft, drugs, drunkenness, and gross
indiscipline17.” Kandeh (1999, 356) describes them as “the product of
both elite pillage and subaltern banditry.” In Sierra Leone, they are
generally referred to as ‘rarray boys’. This social group has a long history of
association with the conduct of political violence, but not its organization
and leadership. In the late 1960s, Siaka Stevens and the APC had used
them as political thugs for hire; in many cases, ironically, to quell student
protest.
Their ties to student radicalism as their environment and practices
became more common in a development of quasi-gentrification in
the 1970s. Rarray boys congregated in potes18 where, initially, illegal
activities were common-place and connected to the underworld of
organized crime. As the pote became increasingly mainstream to the
Freetown middle-class, the environment was gradually transformed to
an arena of intellectual exchange, especially in terms of sociopolitical
ideas. Within that context, student radicals who possessed the knowledge
to vocalize the grievances of marginalization became increasingly
influential in an association characterized by an interesting commonality.
Student radicals considered themselves at the margins of mainstream
society but for reasons different than the traditional characterization
17The definition, as well as general usage in Sierra Leone, follows Karl Marx’s
introduction of the term lumpenproletariat to describe marginalized elements of the
proletariat. It is interesting - and somewhat ironic - that Marx considered this class to be
detrimental to the revolutionary potential of the proletariat, since they had no incentive
to change the existing sociopolitical order.
18Establishments largely similar in nature to English pubs.
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of lumpenproletariat ; they were marginals because their education
and aspirations for sociopolitical change had no avenue to effect
that transformation in a political system ruled by authoritarian
patrimonialism.
Their frustration was articulated through the aforementioned
amalgamation of different political philosophies. As the two social groups
increasingly interconnected and radicals assumed the role of ideological
(if not necessarily organizational) leaders, there was a general alignment
and pervasiveness of these ideas. Yet while there was widespread rhetoric
of social transformation, there was little in the way of mobilization for
the purposes of armed revolution; in fact, none of the original intellectual
leaders of the movement were part of what eventually became the RUF.
Fanthorpe (2001, 370) even suggests that many of the lumpens “became
active in the RUF when it was still an underground movement and may
have ousted an original leadership of student radicals.”
The specific impetus for action that was missing from the Sierra
Leonean social context was eventually provided in Libya. It was there
that revolutionary sentiment was fomented and the inception of a
revolutionary core began. Muammar Qaddafi’s regime funded the training
of revolutionary volunteers from all over Africa at his training camps in
Benghazi. Alie Kabba, a student radical expelled from Fourah Bay College
and studying in Ghana with Libyan funds, became the liaison charged
with recruiting Sierra Leoneans (Abdullah 1998, 214). Among those who
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answered the call in the late 1980s were Abu Kanu, Rashid Mansaray,
and Foday Sankoh, the eventual triumvirate of the RUF. As the majority
of the student radicals in Freetown turned against the idea of military
action and declined the invitation, the resulting group was composed of
mostly unemployed, relatively uneducated, young lumpens. Sankoh was
a distinctive anomaly; much older than the rest and with little exposure
to their ideological philosophy, his emphasis was on militancy alone19. As
the attempt to organize came to naught amidst growing infighting within
this nascent group, Sankoh returned to Sierra Leone where he grew closer
to Kanu and Mansaray and embarked on attempts to recruit individuals to
their fledgling cause.
The other pivotal external connection that facilitated the formation
of the RUF was provided by Liberia. There is debate over whether Sankoh
and Charles Taylor became personally acquainted during their time in
Libya (Abdullah 1998, 220). What is certain though is that Taylor and
other members of his NPFL networked with Sierra Leoneans in Libya and
kept those lines of communication open later on between Freetown and
Monrovia. By 1990, some of the Sierra Leonean group that had trained
in Libya a few years earlier (including Kanu and Mansaray) were actively
participating with the NPFL. The favor was repaid by Taylor when the first
incursion of the RUF back into Sierra Leone took place.
19Gberie (2005) offers the best biographical account of Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader.
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Initially the RUF was composed of: 1) those who had trained
with the RUF leaders in Libya and followed them to Liberia; 2) Sierra
Leonean expatriates recruited in Liberia; and 3) a contingent of Liberians
“on loan” from the NPFL together with a small contingent of Burkinabe
mercenaries. Thus, at this point, the organizing principle of the core did
indeed constitute a collective goal, at least in terms of its expression to
potential recruits: the overthrow of a decrepit and corrupt sociopolitical
system that systematically appropriated the resources of its population.
The message did in fact resonate with some who voluntarily joined the
RUF; after all, there was little opposition to the sentiment itself among
those Sierra Leoneans not favored by the clientilistic regime in Freetown.
But the RUF never moved beyond this generic stated objective; it
never developed specific programs for a future Sierra Leone where the
sociopolitical conditions would be different for individual citizens. The
only document that the RUF ever produced was the propaganda booklet
Footpaths to democracy: towards a new Sierra Leone; it started to circulate
in 1995, four years after the incursion of the RUF over the Liberian
border. According to Abdullah (1998, 223), the document was the first of a
two-volume work; the second never came. When asked in a 2000 interview
what policies the RUF would pursue if it came to power, Foday Sankoh’s
response was that they were still preparing them, almost a decade into
the conflict! As is explained below, the RUF’s approach to achieving its
goals was never articulated to the population from which it could draw
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support and participation. Instead, as the violence mounted and the RUF
squandered the favorable popular opinion that it briefly enjoyed at the
beginning of the conflict, it came to rely on forcible recruitment once the
pool of volunteerism had dried up.
4.3.2 Establishment of the CDF
As the conflict progressed, the Sierra Leonean population came to
increasingly regard the RUF as a threat, and the ever-changing
governmental institutions as unable or unwilling to provide for their
security or even complicit to the threat. In this vacuum, the need for
security provision was to some degree fulfilled by the Civil Defense Forces.
Hoffman characterizes the CDF as “the militarization of a social network”
(2007, 639) and “a web of social relations” (2007, 640). Based on traditional
hunting societies, the CDF provided an already existing organization
which exhibited not only combat-readiness (due to the function of their
traditional role) but also combat-worthiness. By the time the SLPP regime
called upon the CDF - specifically, the Mende Kamajors - to serve as
quasi-governmental forces20, they had already “distinguished themselves
in 1994 in a series of encounters around Bo [District] with elements of the
rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF)” (Zack-Williams 1997, 375).
20CDF groups were endorsed (sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly) by the
government but they were never officially a subdivision of the Sierra Leonean Army. In
fact, the relationship between the CDF and the SLA was overall quite strained. In cases
where the phenomenon of ‘sobels’ was evident, CDF groups treated the SLA in the same
way as the RUF.
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Individual organizations within the CDF were ethnically based.
While disproportionate attention has been given to the Mende
Kamajors21 since they were the largest organization, there were also
CDF organizations of other ethnicities. There were organizations of
Kuranko (the Tamaboros22), of Temne (the Gbethis and the Kapras) and
of Kono (the Donsos) ethnicity. All of these were further subdivided
into localized collectives. Each of these was composed of specialized
hunters enlisted to fulfill their traditional role of protecting their villages.
Since their locus of operation was both regional and ethnically-based,
CDF forces did not tend to see other CDF groups as a threat. Largely
as a result of this regional territorial distribution, “the CDF is the only
armed group ever to have been popular among Sierra Leone’s population”
(Ducasse-Rogier 2004, 25).
There are, however, a number of criticisms leveled against the
CDF; in some ways, the CDF and the RUF - in fact, every organization
that engaged in political violence in Sierra Leone - appear very similar.
Like the organization that they so brutally but effectively resisted, they
also engaged in the illegal diamond trade, and they also committed
human rights’ violations. Ferme and Hoffman (2004, 73) argue that
“once militias left their local functions of grassroots civil defense units
and moved beyond the territories where they were recruited, they made
21This is the spelling of the word that is most widely used; it may be interchangeably
spelled as Kamajohs or Kamajoisia.
22In fact, the Tamaboros were the first to organize as a militia during the conflict.
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strategic decisions in combat based on a selective interpretation of
humanitarian discourse and practices.” Johnson (2008) attributes the
atrocities committed by CDF forces to the lack of monitoring and oversight
of local commanders by a central hierarchy. In other words, the attribute
that allowed the CDF flexibility both in its recruitment and operations was
also the reason for the inability to rein in excesses by localized groups;
ultimately, there were no repercussions for conduct, at least at the time,
for CDF leaders.
It is interesting to note that while the composition of the various
CDF groupings introduced a - theretofore absent - ethnic component
to the conflict, the salience of ethnic division was never a contributing
factor to the conflict either in the conduct of different organizations or
to its outcome. Another interesting development is that some Kamajors
went on to fight in Liberia where they exhibited more brutality in attacks
targeting civilians (Hoffman 2004).
Even as the brutality of CDF fighters came to resemble that of the
rebels, their social origins greatly differed. Individual participants were
recruited through the traditional subdivisions of the Sierra Leonean social
network and the roles that they fulfilled were predicated on traditional
social norms. Such traditional social norms guided specific patterns of
behavior as expected from participants; for example, Hoffman (2007, 651;
also see Leach 2000) illustrates the social norm of “standing for” others
in the community. Ferme and Hoffman (2004, 74) illustrate that “the
124
‘practices of the self’ and ethical codes developed within the hunting
militias” were rooted in longstanding tradition; as they claim they were
“inherited from regional political and social history.”
The Kamajor association with tradition blended the practicalities
of organizing principles with the functions of hunting and medicine in
mystical ways. Strict hierarchies and exclusionary initiation rituals created
a heavily regimented structure that lent itself to militaristic organization.
At the same time, however, attributes such as “‘contractual’ associations
with bush spirits” (Leach 2000, 588), as well as beliefs about magical forces
and a traditional discourse on the bond between rural communities and
the rain forest, restricted the scope of potential recruitment to the initiated
among the community (Muana 1997). It is interesting to note that in
contrast to both the RUF and the SLA, CDF groups maintained their ranks
over their active period in the conflict and exhibited fierce loyalty.
In addition to the normative aspect of tradition that served to
constrain behavior, the functional aspect was equally, if not more
significant. The overlapping roles of hunter and warrior over a long
period of time created a class of individuals with a set of skills that
were directly transferable to the battlefield. Proficiency with weaponry23,
marksmanship, stealth, and - most significantly - a familiarity of their
rural surroundings meant that hunting militias could be transformed into
23Ferme and Hoffman (2004, 75) note that, despite the primacy of tradition in Kamajor
organization, they were also associated with technology in weaponry. This attribute
normally is omitted in accounts of the CDF that focus on the pre-modern archetypes
and mystical characteristics of the hunting societies.
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guerrilla units with little need for reorganization. Leach (2000, 590) reports
that Kamajor groups recruited among the many poro (regionally-based
fraternal organizations) which inducted “only local children whose moral
characters were well known.” These local organizations provided the
intelligence, organization, and hierarchy necessary for the maintenance
of the Kamajors’ networked structure. Moreover, inclusion in the
hunting organizations of local communities was performance-dependent,
“requiring evidence of impressive killing, gained in hunting perhaps over
a long period” (Leach 2000, 589). As the CDF came under increasing attack
from both the RUF and the AFRC-led army, “the esoteric ritual aspects of
induction into the CDF-Kamajor militias became more important (and the
cost of initiation more expensive), and centrally controlled by a handful of
initiators” (Ferme and Hoffman 2004, 77).
Another major advantage of the usage of the CDF for the Kabbah
administration was in terms of cost cutting (Zack-Williams 1997).
According to Riley (1997, 288) “the 110 mercenaries and ‘advisers’
provided by Executive Outcomes cost US$1.7m a month.” The cost of
security provision was one of the justifications given by Koroma, the
leader of the AFRC, for the coup. Riley (1997, 290) states that Koroma’s
claims of the underfunding of the SLA compared to the private security
companies and the CDF were grossly exaggerated. For example, Koroma
claimed that there were 37,000 Kamajors on the government’s payroll,
while a United Nations study estimated their strength at 2,500 to 3,000.
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However, the shifting patterns of participation in the CDF makes any
attempt at determining a definitive size of the force very difficult; for
example, Leach (2000, 588) estimates that, at times, the CDF totaled
between 15,000-25,000.
4.3.3 Subgroups of organized violence
4.3.3.1 The ‘Sobel’ phenomenon
The development of so-called ‘Sobels’ - a portmanteau of the phrase
“soldiers by day, rebels by night” - is a distinct phenomenon of the
Sierra Leone civil war. Similarly to the RUF core, most ‘sobels’ were
lumpen youths (Kandeh 1999). As the conflict progressed, the RUF swelled
in numbers through forced recruitment, while the CDF militias were
coming together both as defense forces and as substitutes for the SLA.
In response, the SLA lowered its standards and increasingly recruited
lumpen youths, throwing them into the heat of battle with little formal
training. President Momoh admitted that “in the quest to increase
numbers, training standards dropped and discipline may have subsided
also, because not much time was given to screening entrants. The result is
that a large number of undesirables, waifs, strays, lay-abouts and bandits
may now be in the nation’s military uniform” (West Africa, 28 October - 3
November, 1996, 1676).
As ‘sobels’ were generally indistinguishable from regular soldiers,
the Sierra Leonean population increasingly came to fear everyone in
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uniform, the very people that were charged with protecting them. In
this context, it is easy to see why local CDF groups were more popular
than the SLA. This also meant that it was becoming more difficult to
conceptualize a viable end to the conflict. Since the SLA did not have total
control of its forces, the usage of external security forces such as Executive
Outcomes was justified as the only means of securing the country’s
precious resources (Harding 1997). This was of paramount importance
to the government since the ‘Sobelization’ of the Army perpetuated itself
through a process of recruitment for diamond mining purposes (Kandeh
1999, 364).
Since ‘sobels’ were not a distinct organization of political violence,
it is not included here as an entity in opposition to the RUF and
the CDF separate from the SLA. Nevertheless, understanding all the
processes that developed during the conflict serves to explain observable
patterns of behavior, especially when those patterns may seem irrational
and perverse. Ultimately, the phenomenon is the outcome of a weak
institutional hierarchy and of insufficient monitoring mechanisms. One
of the main objectives of this study is the differentiation between states
and non-state actors in the organization of political violence. Perhaps
the defining attributes of difference is the oft-mentioned monopoly over
the legitimate use of force, and the institutionalization of recruitment
mechanisms in order to maintain that monopoly, as well as its legitimacy.
The Sierra Leonean state clearly fell short on both of those counts.
128
4.3.3.2 The West Side Boys
While the splinter group known as the West Side Boys did not emerge
through an autonomous process and were not as significant to the conflict
as the major organizations of political violence, a brief discussion of its
development can highlight some patterns that shed light onto the overall
characterization of the conflict. The WSB resulted from a confluence of
factors. The SLA’s attempt to increase its size in response to the RUF’s
forcible recruitment led to both organizations being populated by lumpen
youths. In the case of the SLA, many of them came to power with the
AFRC in 1998. The AFRC’s reign was short-lived, as its relationship with
the RUF quickly disintegrated. Over the next year, the AFRC devolved into
a multitude of smaller armed groups that roamed the streets of Freetown
and the surrounding areas. None of them captured global imagination
more than the WSB, partly due to the exposure that they received in
Western media as a result of Operation Barras, and partly due to their
colorful nature and their image that was based on American hip-hop
music (Reno 2003, 60).
Utas and Jorgel (2008) analyze how the WSB functioned as a
military/economic unit in the wartime economy of Sierra Leone. Looting
and trading arms, medicine, drugs, diamonds, or any other contraband
that came within their reach became the primary function of the WSB.
The organization never made any political pronouncements nor did it
develop a social agenda. If there was a purely predatory VPO in the Sierra
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Leone civil war, this was it; the WSB was an ideal type resource extraction
organization. Yet the WSB was not a band of rag-tag group of criminals,
as they are often portrayed in the Western media. Their leaders were
part of the same network of SLA officials that produced the AFRC. So
their organizational skills and principles essentially mirrored those of the
SLA. Their tactics and operations were characterized by formal military
structure, and not by chaotic, purposeless violence.
4.4 Recruitment patterns
Since the end of the war various studies of active participation have
been conducted that have yielded illuminating results, especially since
they have made available individual accounts of combatants that detail
their experiences during the war (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; 2006;
2008; Maclure and Denov 2006; Mazurana and Carlson 2004; Peters and
Richards 1998).
Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) conducted a detailed survey of
ex-combatants of all primary organizations in the conflict: the RUF, the
CDF, and the SLA. Their findings present some very interesting patterns
of recruitment and confirm the analysis presented above. They find
that the vast majority of combatants of both the RUF and the CDF were
uneducated and poor. Their findings also support the stipulation that
while there may have been a small class of intellectuals that formed the
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core of the RUF at the beginning of the conflict, the average level of
education of fighters declined continuously throughout the course of the
conflict, proportionally to the decline in average age of participation as
child combatants were increasingly recruited.
The RUF recruited the majority of its fighters in the first years of the
conflict in two major “recruiting drives” in 1991-92 and 1996-98. Social
networking did not play a significant role in the process, since participants
were largely recruited by force. According to survey participants, 85%
of them were recruited as RUF combatants by strangers. Furthermore,
87% of RUF combatants reported being forcibly abducted into the faction
whereas only 9% suggested that they joined voluntarily in support of the
group’s political goals. The authors conclude that this pattern remains
consistent throughout the conflict and that there is little evidence that
different recruitment patterns were ever at work in the early stages of the
conflict for the RUF.
RUF combatants claimed that they fought to express dissatisfaction,
to root out corruption, and to bring down the existing regime. They were
promised jobs, money, and women; during the war, they received women,
drugs, and sometimes more valuable goods. If leaders of the factions did in
fact make large fortunes from these industries, these profits do not help to
explain the motivations of the vast majority of combatants. Throughout
the conflict, the interests of most fighters, particularly those in the RUF,
remained focused on basic needs (access to security, food, and education)
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and not on the political agenda of the movement or on control of lucrative
resources. Incentives also included access to drugs, and for some, license
to engage in sexual exploitation and violence.
Conversely, the majority of CDF recruits joined in the late 1990s,
as the militias formed as a counter-balancing force to the RUF. Each
of the ethnically-based organizations that made up the CDF originated
from tight networks of families, friends, and communities. It had much
higher levels of voluntary recruitment: 77% of respondents were recruited
by a friend, relative, or community leader and 15% joined of their own
accord. According to Johnston (2008, 132) Mende youths were conscripted
- essentially hand-picked - into bands by local elders. Moreover, new
members of the CDF typically joined units in which they had family
members, friends, or members of their communities. Interestingly, while
there is a general consensus on the role that community ties played in
recruitment by the CDF, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006, 443) do not find
a “strong relationship between the extent of combatant-community ties
and the patterns of abuse.”
CDF fighters argued that they aimed to defend their communities
from the violence brought to their regions by the war. Political motivations
notwithstanding, there were strong material incentives as well. The CDF
helped to meet the basic needs of the members and provided increased
security for their families. In contrast to RUF combatants, 62% of CDF
combatants reported joining because they supported the group’s political
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goals. Many participated because they were scared of what would happen
if they did not join, or in order to exact revenge on the RUF. Interviews of
ex-combatants conducted by Human Rights Watch (2005, 11) corroborate
these results: “Nearly all of those who originally fought with the RUF had
been abducted and pressed into military service. Almost all those in the
CDF militia, said that they joined to protect their villages and communities
from rebel attack.”
Mazurana and Carlson (2004, 3) report that out of the approximately
45,000 combatants that were recruited by the RUF over the course of the
conflict, roughly 22,5000 (50%) were child soldiers of which 7,500 (17%)
were girls24. By contrast, they estimate that 17,216 (25%) of the total of
68,865 CDF combatants were child soldiers of which 1,722 (2.5%) were
girls. The authors report that nearly all girl combatants surveyed stated
“abduction” and “forced recruitment” as the recruiting mechanism by
which they came to join either organization. They present the following
data on the roles that girl combatants fulfilled: 72% acted as cooks; 68%
as porters; 62% as assistants for the sick and wounded; 60% as “wives”;
44% as food producers; 40% as messengers among 17 rebel camps; 22%
as spies; 18% percent as communications technicians; and 14% percent as
workers in diamond mines. Clearly, girl combatants fulfilled multiple roles
as part of either the RUF or the CDF. Moreover, 44% of all girl combatants
received basic military and weapons training from their commanders and
24The authors report that the average age of girl combatants was twelve.
133
saw active duty as fighters. Amnesty International (1998, 29) reports that
children as young as seven years old “were still seen carrying arms and
guarding CDF checkpoints”.
Maclure and Denov (2006) state that out of a sample of 36 boys
that were recruited by the RUF between the ages of thirteen and sixteen,
not even one was a voluntary participant. They report that their early
days with the organization consisted of intense indoctrination intended
to sever the boys’ ties to their home and their community; in many cases,
the RUF had killed their parents in order to leave nothing for the boys
to return to in case they escaped. The boys were routinely subjected to
violence; not as punishment (even though punishment was severe when
necessary) but as a process of inculcating them with an acceptance of the
normalcy of violent behavior and desensitizing them from both receiving
and perpetrating violence.
There were actually incentives provided as reward for performance.
RUF fighters would receive promotions (typically over new recruits which
created a hierarchy of boys leading younger boys), drugs, and girls that
served as workers and/or “wives”. Drugs served as reward for deeds
in battle, as preparation for battle, as a way of developing addictions
in fighters that the RUF commanders controlled, and as painkillers.
Combatants interviewed by Peters and Richards (1998, 186) state that
they used marijuana, injections of amphetamines, crack cocaine or a
cocktail of substances including gunpowder. Peters and Richards’ findings
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contrast with those of the studies cited above by focusing on voluntary
juvenile participants. However, given that the sample size of their study
is 22 interviews of which nine are accounts of voluntary participations,
it is difficult to extrapolate those statements to a combined force of
over 130,000 combatants, of which more than 48,000 were recruited as
children25. By comparison, the sample size in Humphreys and Weinstein’s
studies (2004; 2006) is over 1,200 (of which roughly 200 were juvenile
participants in the organizations, but not active combatants) and the
sample size of Mazurana and Carlson’s study (2004) includes 50 in-depth
interviews with girl combatants, 60 interviews with community leaders,
and all the official data from the DDR program in their estimates of total
figures.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter applies a theoretical framework of recruitment by
organizations of political violence. The framework focuses on the role of
social networks and social norms as an alternative to the provision
of selective benefits in resolving collective action problems. The
analysis of the RUF serves as an example of a case study where the
organization’s deviation from the optimal strategy suggested by the
framework constrained its future options. The RUF made its case to the
25Peters and Richards (1998) even state that the accounts are “typical” in their
experience.
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Sierra Leonean population in the early 1990s as an organization that
intended to fight a corrupt government. In fact, later on Sankoh would
openly declare that his goal was to replace the corrupt government. As
this realization progressively became apparent to Sierra Leoneans, the
support that the RUF enjoyed at the early stages of the conflict began to
wane. Having no viable plan to utilize the sociopolitical environment of
Sierra Leone in a way that would attract recruitment, the RUF increasingly
turned to force in order to maintain its ranks.
On the other hand, the CDF which arose in direct opposition to the
RUF, exhibited the very characteristics that are central to the framework:
usage of existing social networks and norms in optimizing recruitment.
Through the use of localized information channels and mechanisms, the
CDF instilled a selective recruitment process through the consideration
of past performance that was directly applicable to the task at hand. The
linkage of hunting societies, fraternal organizations, and militias created a
system that transposed existing hierarchies to a new form of organization,
and expedited the formation of a networked pattern of participation with
desirable features. The localized system provided personal incentives
for participation to individual recruits, and concurrently discouraged
shirking since it created a linkage between performance and reputation
in a communal setting. Moreover, the system allowed for fluidity in
participation, whereby individuals could join at different times since the
costs associated with reintegration were low.
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The Sierra Leonean civil war is frequently categorized as a case
study of the effects of lootable goods on the causes of civil war, or as a case
of greed in the ‘greed and grievance’ debate. This analysis illustrates that
neither greed nor grievance adequately captures the dynamics of civil war
as they develop over the duration of a conflict that undergoes significant
transformations. Moreover, while greed may account for a broad, static
characterization of the conflict - i.e. different organizations of political
violence engaging in resource predation - it cannot capture the nuances
of how these organizations go about putting together a fighting force. As
a result, it can account neither for the way in which these organizations





This chapter reviews the results from the application of the theoretical
framework that I propose in this dissertation to the two case studies of
the project. It then presents the limitations of the study in its present form
as well as possible solutions to those limitations to be included in future
iterations of the study.
Briefly restated, the theoretical expectations of the framework form
three hypotheses: 1) broad social norms of expected behavior make
both the organization and conduct of political violence less costly; 2)
traditions that favor characteristics of combat-related behavior make the
organization of political violence less costly; 3) the structure of the social
network affects both of the above.
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Are these expectations evident in the cases studied? Was the
organization of political violence generally, and recruitment specifically,
favored by the conditions present in each of the two sociopolitical
environments?
5.2 Summary of results
5.2.1 Results from the Chechnya case study
In many ways, the analysis of organized political violence in Chechnya in
the First War comes across as an illustrative case study of the theoretical
framework. By all accounts, the long-standing traditions that characterize
Chechen society promote behavioral traits that are transferable to combat
scenaria. Moreover, the well-defined and rigid structure of the social
network was incorporated into the configuration of the VPOs that
emerged. The two mechanisms were mutually reinforcing: traditional
social norms helped define and maintain the structure of the social
network, while the strength and rigidity of the social network facilitated
monitoring and enforcement of social norms.
Yet the case study reveals that an evaluation of the Russo-Chechen
conflict in its entirety is not as simple as it perhaps first appears. Much of
the literature that describes the conflict - especially the more journalistic
accounts (Goltz 2003; Karny 2000; Nivat 2001) - tends to suffer from a
tendency to mythologize the Chechen nation. Invariably, accounts cover
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the same elements: Leo Tolstoy’s expressed admiration for the bravery of
Chechen warriors in his last novel Hadji Murat, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s
similar depiction of Chechen prisoners in The Gulag Archipelago, Mikhail
Lermontov’s negatively stereotypical depiction of Caucasians as brigands
in his poem ‘Cossack Lullaby’, and a long-standing mistrust of Russian
imperialism culminating in the traumatic effects of the forced deportation
of the entire Chechen-Ingush nation to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1944
by the Stalinist regime. While all these are relevant to a character study
of the Chechen people, they hold little utility in explaining the causal
factors of conflict or the organization of political violence beyond the
general level. If the collective memory of deportation was a causal factor
in 1994, why had it remained dormant for so long? A much more plausible
explanation is that once the processes that led to conflict were underway,
galvanizing Chechen public sentiment around rallying cries of unity was
the result of an instrumental strategy by Chechen elites (Williams 2000).
In the same way, the elements of the theoretical framework that
I propose may be interpreted as exaggerated in the case of Chechnya.
In fact, as the analysis presented in the case study chapter indicates,
it is easy to overstate the case and make a direct linkage between the
social components of the Chechen nation and the causes of the conflict.
However, the claim presented here is not that Chechen social norms and
networks were the cause of the conflict or even that they were the “cause”
of recruitment. Rather, the claim is that they optimized recruitment
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by lowering recruitment costs, as well as by facilitating monitoring and
enforcement of participation. In other words, care must be taken to avoid
confusing facilitating conditions with causal mechanisms.
The mythologizing tendencies of the coverage of the First War
were replaced by similar tendencies in the Second War, only this time
the depictions of Chechens were not as favorable. During the First
War, coverage of the conflict - especially by Western media - portrayed
Chechens as victims of Russian aggression and Chechen rebels as valiant,
even romantic, figures playing a part in the latest iteration of a seemingly
interminable struggle. Evidently, the primordialist argument of “ancient
hatreds” was difficult to resist. During the Second War, however, the
depiction of Chechens shifted from brave victims to jihadist terrorists
with similarities in both organization and conduct to Osama bin Laden’s
Al-Qaeda network (Murphy 2004)1.
These tendencies serve to further differentiate (at least in terms
of general perception) the First from Second War by creating the image
of two distinct types of Chechens fighting in each case. Beyond mere
image, there is also evidence of different characterizations of the conflict
(ethnonationalist vs. religious jihadist), different strategies (defense of
the Chechen homeland vs. attacks on Russian soil), and different tactics
(guerrilla insurgency vs. terrorist attacks). In fact, many accounts of the
Second War treat the earlier conflict as a completely separate and discreet
1Attempts by the Russian elite under Putin certainly promoted this demonization of
Chechen identity; see Russell (2005).
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event. It is somewhat ironic then to consider that the personnel involved
were largely the same; in fact, as already stated, the people who brought
the First War to an end - Shamil Basayev and his ‘Abkhaz Battalion’ - were
the very same people who initiated the Second War. Another example
is the disproportionate attention paid to the external element of support
from global jihadist networks. Many accounts focus on the role that Ibn
Al-Khattab played in the conflict; few of them examine his considerable
involvement in the First War. As the case study illustrates, practically all
of the elements that came to characterize the Second War were either
present during the First War, or resulted from it. Thus, the conflict must
be considered as one episodic process rather than two discreet events.
The framework captures the dynamic aspects of this process by
highlighting the contrast in recruitment patterns and the organization of
political violence between the First and Second War. Whereas in the first
instance recruitment patterns mirror the expectations of the framework,
in the second they present quite the opposite pattern. Chechen groups
that operated during the Second War (and some still do) under the banner
of a religious conflict, and especially those that placed the Chechen plight
into the context of a global jihad, restricted their own pool of potential
participants. This reconfiguration of the basis of the conflict led to a
gradual but inexorable process towards internal fragmentation, and an
increasing alienation from the traditions of Chechen society. As a result,
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usage of the social norms and the robust Chechen social network became
increasingly unavailable as facilitating mechanisms for recruitment.
This analysis highlights another element of the theoretical
framework. If VPOs use these mechanisms - as the framework suggests
- then we can expect a higher likelihood of success in recruitment.
However, it is not the case that VPOs can simply choose to use these
mechanisms; if that was the case, then they would all do so. It would
make little sense for any organization, be it one of political violence or
otherwise, to not take advantage of mechanisms that are both cost-free
and cost-reducing. The framing of the organizational structure in terms of
its pronouncements and engagement with the population largely defines
the extent to which the use of these mechanisms will be available to VPOs.
The variation in the organization of Chechen resistance in the First and
Second War is a testament to that, as is the variation in the organization
of political violence in the case of Sierra Leone which is discussed below.
5.2.2 Results from the Sierra Leone case study
The analysis of the Sierra Leonean Civil War also yields some interesting
and counter-intuitive results. At face value, it seems like a simple case
to judge - and evidently many commentators have found that to be
the case (Grant 2005; Hirsch 2001; Le Billon 2005) - as a conflict of
resource predation. As already mentioned, journalistic accounts in the
1990s (Ignatieff 1993b, Kaplan 1994) used Sierra Leone as a prototypical
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example of what future wars would look like: anomic to the point of
chaos, wantonly violent, and with little of the perceived ethos and ideology
of past conflicts. That depiction of the conflict has persisted and has
actually been reinforced by some of the unusual imagery that grasped
the imaginations of Western spectators: heavily tattooed RUF fighters
with bandoliered chests, West Side Boys with their Tupac Shakur shirts,
or Mende Kamajors in their ritualistic garb, so many of all of them at such
a young age.
Yet even social scientists that went beyond the spectacle came up
with rather straightforward characterizations of the conflict. The most
overwhelmingly popular interpretation has been that the Sierra Leonean
Civil War was fought over the control of lootable resources, namely alluvial
diamond mining operations. Thus, in the ‘greed and grievance’ debate,
this case seems to fall squarely in the category of greed. And it is indeed the
case that diamonds played a significant role in the conflict: every major
participant - the RUF, the ‘Sobels’, even the largely defensive CDF - were
involved in illicit diamond mining and trading. Yet the causal factor at
work remains unclear.
There are various ways to consider the effects of the ‘resource curse’
of diamonds during the conflict. It could be that the various participants
organized specifically with the objective of resource extraction, in which
case diamonds may be regarded as a causal factor of conflict onset. It
could be that once the participants were organized and were faced with
144
the costs of continued operation, they then sought to gain those resources
for sustenance of their organizational structure. Or it could simply be that
the acquisition of these resources was relatively easy and that participants
took them because they were there for the taking. An examination of
the historical record suggests that both of the latter were definitely the
case at different times for different organizations in the conflict. Yet
the usage most employed by political scientists is the first one, as part
of a framework that explains the causal relationship between lootable
resources and conflict onset.
But where is the evidence for this assertion? As illustrated
above, the establishment of the RUF’s core was the result of a marriage
of strange bedfellows: student radicals with philosophical ideologies
for sociopolitical transformation, and lumpen underclass youths that
eventually provided the actual core of combatants once the more timid
elements of student radicalism were swept aside over time. At no point
was resource extraction the stated goal of this nascent core, at least in
the early stages of development; at its outset this was a group that came
together due to a mutual sentiment of marginalization by the existing state
institutions. In other words, if anything, their guiding motivation was
grievance and not greed at that stage. Moreover, since the appropriation
of the state’s resources had been common practice for Sierra Leone’s
patrimonial governments, there needs to be some explanation for the
time-frame in which the conflict developed. In other words, why in the
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early 1990s and not previously? There had been many previous coups
(successful or attempted) in Sierra Leone’s history; were diamonds the
cause of those as well, and if not, why not?
In simple terms, the problem is that a static variable is employed
in order to explain what is essentially a dynamic process. That is
indeed a more general problem with the dichotomies that have come to
characterize recent scholarship in the research area of civil wars. The
Sierra Leonean case exemplifies the need for analytical tools that can
capture the dynamism and complexity of individual conflicts both at
the macro (causation) and the micro (individual participation) level of
analysis.
In terms of the framework’s parameters, the juxtaposition of the
RUF and the CDF highlights one of the advantages of making the VPO
the unit of analysis. There is no constraint to adopt one overarching
explanation as the cause of the conflict. In general terms, what may be the
motivating principle for one VPO could turn out to be the exact opposite
for another. On the other hand, if it is the case that different participants
to the conflict are fighting over the same objective, the framework is just as
compatible with that. Moreover, the framework allows for the examination
of VPOs as they evolve during a conflict. Events such as the splintering
or morphing of groups (as in the examples of the West Side Boys and
the ‘Sobels’) do not present a problem in this respect. Ultimately, a level
of analysis that prioritizes the organizational level and uses data at the
146
individual level serves as a link between the macro and micro levels in
ways that broader conceptualizations of conflict causation cannot.
In terms of the framework’s hypotheses, there is a clear contrast
between the two VPOs, similarly to the case of Chechnya. The RUF did not
exhibit any linkage between Sierra Leonean social norms and traditions
of conduct and its recruitment mechanisms; nor did its structure bear
any resemblance to the social network at large. As such, its long
term prospects for optimizing recruitment were minimal. Whether the
RUF would have not engaged in resource extraction had it used those
mechanisms is a counterfactual that cannot be ascertained. However,
since the organization targeted the diamond-rich regions of Sierra Leone
from the very beginning of its incursion suggests that there is little reason
to believe that was not the organization’s intention. In the end, the only
plausible interpretation of the organization’s prospects is that both its
recruitment strategies and its conduct from the beginning of the conflict
doomed it to failure, at least in terms of future recruitment. As a result,
the reliance on forcible recruitment created a vicious cycle whereby the
organization’s increase in size created a corresponding opposition to it and
a proportional decrease to the likelihood of voluntary recruitment.
By contrast, the CDF utilized both social norms and networks in
its configuration. In fact, the feedback effect between the two - as
predicted by the theoretical framework - is evident in the case of the
CDF. The ethnic configuration of the social network was mirrored in the
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configuration of the CDF groups, and the social norms associated with
individual ethnicities were embedded in the semi-independent VPOs that
operated on an ethnic as well as regional basis.
5.3 Theoretical implications
As described above in the discussion of results, each case study is
composed of two analyses of the organization of political violence. Both
case studies exhibit within-case variation. In each case study one VPO (in
Chechnya, the Chechen resistance in the First War, and in Sierra Leone,
the CDF) supports the hypotheses of the theoretical framework. Both used
social norms embedded in the sociopolitical environment, both employed
traits that revealed fitness information for combat-related behavior, and
both exhibited an organizational structure that mirrored the structure of
the social network.
On the other hand, the other VPO in each case study (in Chechnya,
the Chechen resistance in the Second War, and in Sierra Leone, the RUF)
did not use social norms, or employ information-revealing mechanisms
or mirror the social network structure. In both cases, there is evidence
to suggest that the organizations did not enjoy the benefits that the
hypotheses describe. This outcome definitely does not reject the
hypotheses but it does not necessarily support them either. The argument
presented by the theoretical framework is that the use of social norms
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and networks lowers costs, not that costs will be lowered if and only if
social norms and networks are used. In other words, the argument is
one of conditionality but not one of biconditionality, since lower costs
could be the result of other antecedent conditions uncaptured by this
theoretical framework. Nevertheless, the outcome is suggestive of the
possibility of a much stronger correlation than initially anticipated, if not
outright biconditionality. This determination can only be made through
subsequent application of the framework to a larger universe of case
studies.
Another significant theoretical implication is that while the two case
studies vary considerably in terms of their overarching characterization
within typologies of conflict processes, the analysis of each illustrates
surprising similarities. The two Russo-Chechen Wars are usually
categorized respectively as an ethnonationalist separatist insurgency and
a religious separatist insurgency. The Sierra Leonean civil war is usually
categorized as a conflict of resource predation. One may assume that
the theoretical framework that I present would be much better suited at
explaining the first type rather than the second. Yet the analysis shows that
the framework has a wide scope of applicability to a universe of cases not
restricted by broad characterizations or static typologies that, ultimately,
tell us very little about the organization of political violence.
However, far from being a definitive statement on the organization
of political violence, there are various limitations of the study. These
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are discussed below along with suggestions for further research that
may remedy those limitations and advance the scope of the theoretical
framework.
5.4 Limitations of the study and suggestions for
further research
The most obvious limitation of the study is the reliance on secondary
literature for data acquisition. There is always the possibility of selection
biases by different authors even in the presentation of seemingly objective
data. Most problematic is the possibility of confirmation bias that may
be undetectable when the original data are not available. To remedy
this limitation, future applications of the theoretical framework must
incorporate original data, integrating first-hand accounts from individual
participants with secondary literature. A related limitation is that the
current application is limited to two case studies. On the other hand, it
is difficult to envision a large-N study that is based on original data purely
on practical grounds.
The acquisition and use of original data will also allow analytical
refinement and the potential use of additional methodological tools.
A common methodological choice for similar theoretical frameworks
is statistical analysis. Since participation at the individual level is a
dichotomous variable, the appropriate methodological technique is the
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use of binomial regression. The most common models used in such
cases are the logit and the probit generalized linear models. The biggest
advantages of this approach would be the ability to disaggregate the
effects of a number of explanatory variables, and the possibility of
operationalizing the variables in the existing formulation of the framework
in new ways. The biggest disadvantage of this approach is that it is
generally static. Since one of the major advantages of the approach that
I present is the ability to track changes in a dynamic environment, it
would not be beneficial for statistical analysis to be the only tool but a
component of a mixed-methods approach.
The other methodological solution that suggests itself is formal
social network analysis. Network theory applications are becoming
increasingly popular in political science, especially in areas of conflict
studies with applications such as transnational terrorist network analysis.
A similar application to the organization of political violence can be used
to examine the exact nature between the structure of a VPO and the social
structure from which it emerges. The comparison of the two network
structures can utilize concepts such as centrality measures in order to
establish the relationship between the hierarchical nature of the two,
as well as communication patterns both within the VPO and across the
two networks. This approach could also examine how the relationship
between the two networks develops through the duration of a conflict.
One limitation to this approach is that while it may prove very useful for
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analyzing the social network component of the framework, it may not
provide as much insight into the interaction between social networks and
social norms. Therefore, as with the possible usage of statistical analysis,
this tool would be more beneficial if used in conjunction with other tools.
The most important theoretical limitation of the project is that
the argument does not (and at this stage cannot) determine the exact
relationship between the two main variables. In other words, it is not
clear whether the effects of social norms have a more significant influence
on the effects of social networks, or vice versa. Given that there are
feedback characteristics between the two mechanisms, the determination
of that relationship can also provide insight into the nature of the causal
relationship between the mechanisms and the probability of successful
recruitment. This would be especially beneficial in conjunction with the
usage of the additional methodological tools described above.
A refinement of the framework and the acquisition of original data
can add an entirely new dimension to its explanatory power. At this stage,
the framework is basically used to provide an answer to the question
of how organizations of political violence come together. But it cannot
provide an answer to the question of why individuals participate that goes
beyond the structure of the collective action problem as presented here.
Thus, the framework focuses on the behavior of individuals as constrained
by their environment but not on their personal choices as defined by their
preferences.
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How are those preferences defined? It is easy to dismiss that
question as too open-ended, since there could be a myriad of explanations
that cause individuals to take action. Partly, that is the reason why so much
of the research in this area tends to overlook micro level considerations.
But surely any answer that is revealed through the careful examination
of individual level data can be illuminating, even if (or, in some sense,
especially if) it reveals that the considerations of the individual are
unrelated to group-level considerations.
A multi-level approach that includes examination of the macro
(broad characterization of individual conflict cases), the meso (VPOs
as the unit of analysis, as in this study), and the micro (individual
participation) level may be achieved by starting at the lowest level with
the use of original data and aggregating results upwards. In other words,
rather than starting at the top with generalized conceptions of conflict
causation, it may be preferable to examine data at the individual level for
possible patterns of interaction that are - for all intents and purposes -
invisible at the higher strata of inquiry.
A final consideration is that in a very obvious sense the project
selects on the dependent variable: case study selection consists of VPOs
that were active in the production of political violence. It does not take
into consideration instances of failure to organize and failure to recruit.
In other words, there is no study of the proverbial “dogs that didn’t
bark”. While there is significant within-case variation in the conflicts in
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Chechnya and Sierra Leone, perhaps a more interesting scenario would be
a case study that exhibits within-case variation where success and failure
in the organization of political violence can be directly contrasted.
5.5 Concluding remarks
This dissertation presented a theoretical framework of recruitment for
the organization of political violence. The framework was applied to
case studies of two conflicts: the Russo-Chechen War (1994–1996 and
1999–2009) and the Sierra Leonean civil war (1991–2002).
The analysis of the case study yielded favorable results for the
applicability of the theoretical framework. Further refinements and
applications of the framework are necessary to reach a conclusive
assessment of its scope. The acquisition of original data is a necessary
step to that same end.
Research on the process, as well as the effects, of recruitment on
other aspects of conflict processes is at a nascent stage in the literature.
Meanwhile, the integration of studies of political violence from previously
disparate research areas is contributing to the development of more
refined analytical and methodological tools to answer such questions,
and a more clearly delineated research agenda on political violence. This






Figure A.1: Map of Chechnya (2001).Source: University of Texas Libraries.
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Figure A.2: Map of Sierra Leone (2005).
Source: University of Texas Libraries.
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